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Lorne Neudorf* Reassessing the Constitutional Foundation
of Delegated Legislation in Canada
This article assesses the constitutional foundation by which Parliament lends its lawmaking
powers to the executive, which rests upon a century-old precedent established by the Supreme
Court of Canada in a constitutional challenge to wartime legislation. While the case law
demonstrates that courts have continued to follow this early precedent to allow the parliamentary
delegation of sweeping lawmaking powers to the executive, it is time for courts to reassess the
constitutionality of delegation in light of Canada's status as a liberal democracy embedded within
a system of constitutional supremacy. Under the Constitution of Canada, Parliament is placed
firmly at the centre of public policymaking by being vested with exclusive legislative authority
in certain subject matters. Parliament must therefore play the principal federal lawmaking role.
The Supreme Court's 1918 judgment should no longer be followed to the extent that it allows
courts to accept near unlimited delegation of Parliament's lawmaking powers to the executive.
Instead, and to that extent, the judgment should be seen as an historical anachronism, a
holding that was suitable for a young country in the context of the First World War but now out
of step with the constitutional role of Parliament as seen through the contemporary approach
to constitutional interpretation. Courts and Parliament must take delegation more seriously,
and constitutional safeguards should be established to better protect the role of Parliament as
lawmaker in chief and restore the proper constitutional balance. Achieving this goal would be
a major advance toward the democratic, representative and accountable federal lawmaking
process contemplated by the Constitution. It is possible through reforms to strengthen the
judicial scrutiny of the vires of regulations and creating effective parliamentary mechanisms to
scrutinize and supervise the exercise of delegated lawmaking powers.
Cet article evalue les fondements constitutionnels qui permettent au Parlement de confier
son pouvoir legislatif a I'executif, lesquels reposent sur un precedent remontant a un si6cle
etabli par la Cour supreme du Canada dans le cadre d'une contestation constitutionnelle
de lois qui prevalaient en temps de guerre. Bien que la jurisprudence demontre que les
tribunaux ont continue de suivre ce precedent pour permettre la delegation parlementaire de
pouvoirs legislatifs considerables a I'executif, il est temps pour les tribunaux de reevaluer la
constitutionnalite de la delegation a la lumiere du fait que le Canada a le statut de democratie
liberale fonde sur la suprematie de la Constitution. En vertu de la Constitution du Canada, le
Parlement est fermement place au centre de I'elaboration des politiques publiques en etant
investi d'un pouvoir legislatif exclusif dans certains domaines. Le Parlement doit donc jouer le
role principal de legislateur federal. Larret de 1918 de la Cour supreme ne devrait plus etre suivi
dans la mesure ou il permet aux tribunaux d'accepter une delegation quasi illimitee des pouvoirs
legislatifs du Parlement a I'executif. Au lieu de cela, et dans cette mesure, le jugement devrait
etre considere comme un anachronisme historique, une position qui convenait a un jeune pays
dans le contexte de la Premiere Guerre mondiale, mais qui nest plus en phase avec le role
constitutionnel du Parlement, comme le montre I'approche contemporaine de l'interpretation
constitutionnelle. Les tribunaux et le Parlement doivent prendre la delegation plus au serieux, et
des garanties constitutionnelles devraient etre etablies pour mieux proteger le role du Parlement
en tant que legislateur en chef et retablir I'equilibre constitutionnel approprie. La realisation de
cet objectif constituerait une avancee majeure vers la realisation du processus legislatif federal
democratique, representatif et responsable prevu par la Constitution. II est possible, grace a
des reformes, de renforcer le controle judiciaire de la legalite de la reglementation et de creer
des mecanismes parlementaires efficaces pour controler et superviser I'exercice des pouvoirs
legislatifs delegues.
* JD (Victoria), LLM (McGill), PhD (Cambridge); Deputy Dean and Associate Professor, Adelaide
Law School, University of Adelaide; Adjunct Professor, Robson Hall, Faculty of Law, University of
Manitoba; Life Member, Clare Hall, University of Cambridge; Member of the Law Society of Upper
Canada. The author would like to thank Oliver Leung for his research assistance, the participants of
the 2017 Symposium on the Constitution of Canada: History, Evolution, Influence and Reform held
at Scuola Sant'Anna in Pisa for comments on an earlier version and the anonymous peer reviewers
for their valuable comments. The author acknowledges the financial support of the Social Science and
Humanities Research Council of Canada in connection with this research The standard disclaimer
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Introduction
The year 2017 marked 150 years since the time of Canadian Confederation
and the coming into force of the British North America Act, 1867,1 the
country's founding document. Since that time, Canada's institutions
have changed by adapting to new economic, political and social realities.
One important trend has been the growth of delegated legislation in the
lawmaking landscape, driven by the increased complexity of modem
life and its seemingly insatiable need for detailed regulations.2 In
1. 30 & 31 Vict, c 3 (UK) [Constitution Act, 1867].
2. Thistrend has beentaking place overalong period of time: seeJohnWillis, ed, CanadianBoards
at Work (Toronto: Macmillan, 1941). In the UK, delegated legislation "is the standard form of law-
Reassessing the Constitutional Foundation of 521
Delegated Legislation in Canada
contemporary Canada, nearly all bills introduced in Parliament include
provisions delegating lawmaking powers to the executive, typically to
the federal cabinet and individual ministers.3 Such bills authorize the
executive to make laws behind closed doors, outside of the ordinary
public parliamentary process. By way of an example, section 27(1) of the
Transportation of Dangerous Goods Act, 1992' provides in part:
The Governor in Council may make regulations generally for carying
out the purposes and provisions of this Act...
Sections 27(1) and 27.1(1) of the Act list 39 areas in which Parliament
has delegated specific lawmaking authority to the federal cabinet.5 Using
these powers, the cabinet has made (among others) the Transport of
Dangerous Good Regulations,' which consists of thousands of provisions
that comprise 481 pages of statutory text-more than 10 times the size
of the parent Act. This is not an isolated example. By volume, delegated
legislation is made at a rate of nearly 5-to-i as compared to primary
legislation. The extensive use of executive lawmaking is part of a
broader trend to shift lawmaking power away from Parliament and into
the hands of the executive. Notably, the Transportation of Dangerous
Goods Act, 1992 refers to regulations 67 further times for a variety of
purposes, including to allow regulations to override all or part of the Act.
For instance, section 3(3) provides that the "Act does not apply to the
extent that its application is excluded by a regulation."8 In other words, not
only are broad lawmaking powers given by Parliament to the executive,
these executive-made laws are permitted in some cases to override or
even amend their enabling legislation. In other cases, "skeleton laws" are
enacted by Parliament to delegate sweeping powers to the executive with
little statutory direction.9
making" and regulations create legal rules relating to the "fundamental areas of national life": Adam
Tucker, "Parliamentary Scrutiny of Delegated Legislation7' in Alexander Home & Gavin Drewry, eds,
Parliament and the Law, 2nd ed (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2018) 347 at 350, 356.
3. In the UK, "[n]early all new Acts of Parliament delegate some degree of legislative power to the
executive": Tucker, ibid at 356.
4. SC 1992, c 34 [TDGA].
5. Ibid, ss 27(1)(a)-27(1)(v), 27.1(1)(a)-27.1(1)(k).
6. SOR/2017-253.
7. See Lorne Neudorf, "The Supreme Court and Parliament: Evolving Roles and Relationships"
(2017) 78 Supreme Court Law Review 3 at 6.
8. TDGA, supra note 4, s 3(3). This section refers to regulations made in relation to importing,
offering for transport, handing, or transporting of dangerous goods: TDGA, supra note 4, s 27(1)(e).
9. Lome Neudorf, "Regulations Gone Wild," National Post (28 January 2016) FPlI. Elmer
Driedger noted that when delegation provisions confer lawmaking discretion for a general purpose,
"the regulation-making authority has a free hand to establish, not only the details, but also the main
principles. The entire law is therefore to be left to the decision of subordinates": Elmer A Driedger,
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In looking at delegated legislation in 1953, JR Mallory wrote that "[i]t
remains to be seen how far Parliament, the public, and political parties can
adjust themselves to the challenge of the administrative state."10 Since that
time, the complexity and challenges of governance have amplified, leading
to a reliance on regulations that Roderick Macdonald once described as
an "apparent addiction."11 Adam Tucker has observed that the prevalence
of delegated legislation in the modem state means that it is the "central
form of legislation in the contemporary constitution."12 While there are
important benefits to Parliament delegating some of its lawmaking powers
to others, such as allowing detailed rules to be made quickly in response
to new circumstances and saving Parliament's time and resources for key
policy debates,1 there are real concerns about the quality, transparency and
accountability of a lawmaking process that is carried out mostly behind
closed doors. Despite the fact that the regulation-making process includes
a limited period of public consultation,14 cabinet deliberations are legally
privileged as cabinet confidences.15 Cloaked in secrecy, the executive
lawmaking process allows lawmakers to ignore comments received on
draft regulations instead of giving them at least the appearance of due
consideration in a public arena. In the realm of executive lawmaking,
there is no public debate, and no formal way of introducing amendments
to proposed laws like in Parliament. To make matters worse, the media
pays virtually no attention to the enactment of new delegated legislation,
which is simply promulgated as afait accompli through its publication in
Part II of the Canada Gazette. 16 Such an environment creates the risk that
important public policy choices could be made covertly through delegated
legislation, allowing the government to avoid scrutiny and political
accountability, a key aspect of the principle of legality.i1
"Subordinate Legislation" (1960) 38:1 Can Bar Rev 1 at 29. See also Tucker, supra note 2 at 357.
10. JR Mallory, "Delegated Legislation in Canada: Recent Changes in Machinery" (1953) 19:4 Can
J Economics & Political Science 462 at 471.
11. Roderick A Macdonald, "Understanding Regulation by Regulations" in Ivan Bernier & Andree
Lajoie, eds, Regulations, Crown Corporations and Administrative Tribunals (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1985) 81 at 81.
12. Tucker, supra note 2 at 357.
13. Cecil T Car observed in 1921 that "Parliament simply has not time" to make all laws directly:
Cecil T Can, Delegated Legislation: Three Lectures (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1921)
at 19. See also Macdonald, supra note 11 at 92.
14. Pursuant to a cabinet directive discussed in Part IV.4.a below.
15. Canada EvidenceAct, RSC 1985, c C-5, s 39.
16. These requirements are discussed in Part IV.4.a below.
17. For a similar trend in the UK see Tucker, supra note 2 at 348 observing that he UK's European
Union (Withdrawal) Bill delegates lawmaking power to the executive that "will involve the exercise
of extensive judgment by the Government."
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This article assesses the constitutional foundation by which
Parliament18 lends its lawmaking powers to the executive, which rests
upon a century-old precedent established by the Supreme Court of Canada
in a constitutional challenge to wartime legislation. While the case law
demonstrates that courts have continued to follow this early precedent to
allow the parliamentary delegation of sweeping lawmaking powers to the
executive, it is time for courts to reassess the constitutionality of delegation
in light of Canada's status as a liberal democracy embedded within a system
of constitutional supremacy. Under the Constitution of Canada, Parliament
is placed firmly at the centre of public policymaking by being vested with
exclusive legislative authority in certain subject matters. Parliament must
therefore play the principal federal lawmaking role. The Supreme Court's
1918 judgment should no longer be followed to the extent that it allows
courts to accept near unlimited delegation of Parliament's lawmaking
powers to the executive. Instead, and to that extent, the judgment should be
seen as an historical anachronism, a holding that was suitable for a young
country in the context of the First World War but now out of step with
the constitutional role of Parliament as seen through the contemporary
approach to constitutional interpretation. Courts and Parliament must
take delegation more seriously, and constitutional safeguards should be
established to better protect the role of Parliament as lawmaker in chief19
and restore the proper constitutional balance. Achieving this goal would
be a major advance toward the democratic, representative and accountable
federal lawmaking process contemplated by the Constitution. It is
possible through reforms to strengthen the judicial scrutiny of the vires of
regulations and creating effective parliamentary mechanisms to scrutinize
and supervise the exercise of delegated lawmaking powers.
18. This article focuses on the federal lawmaking process, although the application of constitutional
and legal principles discussed may also apply to provincial legislatures. Section 92 of the Constitution
Act, 1867, supra note 1 provides exclusive legislative authority in certain matters to "the Legislature"
of each province. A constitutional assessment of delegated legislation in a province would also need to
take into account applicable provincial constitutional norms in each case, which is beyond the scope of
this paper. It is notable that provincial legislatures, like their federal counterpart, delegate considerable
powers to the executive which carries the risk of misuse. For example, see the report of the Ombudsman
of Ontario in relation to a regulation enacted by the Ontario cabinet that provided police with sweeping
powers of investigation and detention in relation to the 2010 G20 summit in Toronto: Ombudsman of
Ontario, Caught in theAct, by Andre Main (Toronto: 7 December 2010), online (pdf): <ombudsman.
on.ca/Files/sitemedia/Documents/Investigations/SORT0%20lnvestigations/G20final-EN-web 1.pdf>
[perma.cc/C8RX-87RT] ["G20 Report"]. Some of the proposed reforms in this article, while geared
toward the federal awmaking process, would also benefit the provincial lawmaking processes, uch
as strengthening the vires review of regulations.
19. Parliament has been referred to as the "grand inquest of the nation": see, e.g., Stockdale v
Hansard (1839), 112 ER 1112 (QB) at 1123; Howard v Gossett (1845), 10 QB 411 (UK) at 414.
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Part I of this article considers the location of sovereignty in Canada from
the time of Confederation in 1867 to the Charter ofRights and Freedoms2"
in 1982. It finds that sovereignty resides in the Constitution as a series of
foundational, legally binding rules and principles as opposed to Parliament
as a sovereign institution in the Diceyan sense. The implication is that the
Constitution places enforceable limits on Parliament's capacity to legislate,
including the delegation of its lawmaking powers to others. Part II sets out
and provides a critical analysis of the case law relating to the constitutional
authority by which Parliament delegates its lawmaking powers. While it
identifies precedent hat supports the constitutional validity of delegation,
it also notes that the case law contemplates enforceable constitutional
limits to delegation. Part III sets out the contemporary living tree approach
to constitutional interpretation and then critiques the Supreme Court's
century-old precedent on delegation from this perspective, demonstrating
the narrow and technical reading of the constitutional text adopted by
the majority in that case, which has stunted judicial conceptions of the
constitutional role of Parliament. In addition to its outmoded approach
to interpreting the Constitution, a number of reasons are suggested for
why this precedent should be reconsidered. Part IV charts a new way
forward by taking a fresh constitutional look at the question of Parliament
delegating its lawmaking powers to the executive. It is apparent from a
purposive approach to the Constitution that Parliament is a key part of the
constitutional architecture as a democratic, representative and accountable
central lawmaker. The Constitution demands that both the courts and
Parliament take the delegation of Parliament's lawmaking powers to
the executive more seriously. Part IV then identifies shortcomings in the
current approaches to the judicial review of the vires of regulations and
the parliamentary scrutiny of regulations. Several reforms are proposed to
strengthen these processes and safeguard Parliament's constitutional role.
Finally, there is a brief conclusion.
I. Locating sovereignty in Canada
1. Introduction
The question of locating sovereignty in Canada is key to the question
of the constitutional authority of Parliament to delegate its lawmaking
powers to the executive. On the one hand, if Canada has a legal system
based principally on an inheritance of parliamentary sovereignty from the
United Kingdom, Parliament is likely to have few or no enforceable limits
20. Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule
B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].
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on its capacity to delegate its lawmaking powers.2 1 On the other hand, if
Canada has a legal system based principally on constitutional supremacy
where hard limits are imposed on Parliament's legislative authority,
and enforced by the courts, the question must be then asked of what the
Constitution requires in relation to the delegation of lawmaking powers
by Parliament to others (if anything). This Part considers conceptions
of sovereignty in Canada from the time of Confederation to the advent
of the Charter, concluding that while Parliament originally enjoyed
considerable lawmaking latitude that was characterized as a form of
limited or qualified sovereignty (although not meeting the strict definition
of Diceyan sovereignty), it was always subject o some enforceable limits
on its powers. Following the nactment of the Charter, however, it is clear
that Parliament's legislative powers have been significantly circumscribed
by the Constitution to the point where it is more accurate to describe
Canadian sovereignty as residing in the Constitution as opposed to a single
lawmaking institution.
2. Defining parliamentary sovereignty
In the first edition of his influential book, Introduction to the Study of
the Law of the Constitution, published in 1885, AV Dicey described the
sovereignty of the Westminster Parliament as "neither more nor less than
this, namely, that Parliament hus defined has.., the ight to make or unmake
any law whatever; and, further, that no person or body is recognised by the
law of England as having a right to override or set aside the legislation
of Parliament."22 Dicey maintained this formulation in each subsequent
edition of the book, writing that its truth "has never been denied."23 In the
introduction to the eighth edition, published in 1931, Dicey reiterated that
parliamentary sovereignty was the "dominant characteristic" of the English
legal system.24 This description of sovereignty represented the idea of
total legislative freedom, with Parliament enjoying unfettered lawmaking
latitude. Dicey wrote that as a foundational principle, parliamentary
sovereignty could never coexist with limitations on Parliament's powers
because any limit would be "a contradiction in terms" with sovereignty.
25
At the same time, however, Parliament could never be truly omnipotent. It
21. Notably an argument could still be made that delegation of sweeping lawmaking powers erodes
the sovereignty of Parliament (especially in relation to Henry VIII clauses): see discussion in Tucker,
supra note 2 at 358-360.
22. Albert Vem Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 8th ed (London:
Macmillan, 1931) at 36.
23. Ibid at xviii-xix.
24. Ibid at xviii-xix, 39.
25. Ibid at 66.
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was limited in a temporal dimension in the sense that today's Parliament
could not control the future state of the law, which was always subject
to amendment by a later Parliament.26 Dicey put forward the argument
that a contemporary Parliament is the true location of sovereignty, writing
that there is "futility inherent in every attempt of one sovereign legislature
to restrain the action of another equally sovereign body."2 He did not,
however, concede this temporal aspect of sovereignty as a real limitation.
It instead operated as a support to ensure that total legislative power
remained in the hands of each new Parliament.28 Parliament, therefore, held
total lawmaking discretion at any moment in time and would be capable
of making any change to the law. For this Part, therefore, parliamentary
sovereignty can be defined as complete and total lawmaking freedom from
the perspective of a contemporary Parliament.
3. A new constitutional era
Pre-Confederation settlements in Canada established colonial legislatures
that were modelled on British institutions, including the Westminster
Parliament. These institutions, however, were always subject to certain
limitations on their powers imposed by the Imperial Parliament.29
On 1 July 1867, the Constitution Act, 186730 came into force and
ushered in a new constitutional era. It founded a country from three
colonial governments by establishing a national institutional framework,
creating Canada's lawmaking institutions and vesting them with certain
roles and functions. Importantly, sections 91 and 92 divided the total
realm of lawmaking authority into two spheres-allocating legislative
power in various subject matters to either the federal Parliament or to the
legislatures of the provinces.31 Federalism was essential to the creation of
Canada, a point recognized by the Supreme Court of Canada in its 1998
judgment in Reference re Secession of Quebec,3 2 which considered the
legality of a unilateral secession from Canada by Quebec. In that case,
26. Ibid at 65. Parliament might also need to pass new legislation in the requisite "manner and form,"
which may have been established by a previous Parliament, although this can be amended.
27. Ibidat 63, 65.
28. Dicey provides several examples: ibid at 62-63. The English case law also supports this view:
see, e.g., the discussion inEllen Streets Estates Ltdv Minister of Health, [1934] 1 KB 590 at 596-597
(per Scrutton and Maugham LJJ).
29. For an overview of pre-confederation legal developments see, e.g., Phillip Buckner, ed, Canada
and the British Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
30. ConstitutionAct, 1867, supra note 1.
31. Ibid, ss 91-92. Although it should be noted that the Constitution places additional limits on
the powers of Parliament than what appears in ss 91-92. For example, s 96 constitutionally shields
superior courts from parliamentary intrusions into their traditional judicial functions.
32. [1998] 2 SCR 217, 161 DLR (4th) 385.
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the unanimous Supreme Court identified federalism as a foundational
principle of the Constitution, observing that it provided a compromise for
colonial delegations at constitutional conferences by being "the political
mechanism by which diversity could be reconciled with unity."33 In limiting
the powers of Canada's lawmaking institutions, therefore, federalism
rejected a single legislature that enjoyed total lawmaking freedom. Despite
some belief that Canada inherited a system of parliamentary sovereignty
from the preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867, which establishes Canada
"with a Constitution similar in Principle to that of the United Kingdom,"
it is clear that at its inception, the federal system meant that its national
Parliament did not meet the Diceyan sense of parliamentary sovereignty.
34
Within the scope of their constitutional competences, however, both
federal and provincial legislatures were free to enact any legislation that
they wished. This broad lawmaking latitude is why early Privy Council
jurisprudence spoke of the Canadian legislatures as holding "plenary
and as ample" powers like the Imperial Parliament,35 but within certain
constitutional constraints. The critical question of demarcating these
bounds was an evolving one that would be determined by judicial
interpretations of the Constitution in individual cases that built up a body of
constitutional jurisprudence over time. In deciding challenges to legislation
under the Constitution Act, 1867, the Privy Council and Supreme Court of
Canada began to illuminate the limitations of state institutions, including
Parliament, and scrutinized statutes for constitutional compliance.
Where statutes were seen by the courts as exceeding their constitutional
authority, they were struck down as legally unenforceable, in clear
contrast with Diceyan sovereignty that allows for the judicial recognition
of constitutional principles but allows for Parliament to legislate against
such norms if it does so expressly and clearly.36 In addition to Canada's
departure from a strict conception of parliamentary sovereignty in 1867,
the Imperial Parliament remained the supreme lawmaker for an array of
33. Ibidatparas 37, 43.
34. For a discussion of whether the parliaments of former British colonies could ever be made truly
supreme by achieving their independence through an Act of the Westminster Parliament (which could,
in theory, be rescinded), see Peter C Oliver, The Constitution of Independence: The Development of
Constitutional Theory in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2005).
35. Hodge v The Queen (1883), 9 App Cas 117 at 132, [9] AC 13 (PC) [Hodge]. The Privy Council
referred to s 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 1 as a limitationto parliamentary sovereignty
in Canada.
36. For an example of a statute being struck down as unconstitutional see Re Board of Commerce Act
1919 and the Combines and Fair Prices Act 1919, [1922] 1 AC 191, 60 DLR 513 (PC). The principle
of legality in this sense is best articulated by Lord Hoffmann in R v Secretary of State for the Home
Department Exp Simms (1999), [2000] 2 AC 115 at 131 (HL (Eng)) [Simms].
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colonies around the world including Canada. This legislative superiority
continued for 64 years until the Statute of Westminster 19313" curtailed the
role of Westminster in Canadian law.
Given enforceable constitutional limits to Parliament's powers, it is
hardly surprising that Dicey himself concluded that the Parliament of
Canada was an institution of a different quality than that at Westminster.
In writing generally about federal states, Dicey observed that the division
of lawmaking powers between spheres of governments created "non-
sovereign legislatures." Specifically, in relation to Canada, Dicey wrote
that its federal Parliament was "not in reality sovereign."3 Dicey viewed
the Constitution Act, 1867 as having been more influenced by American
constitutionalism than British institutions:
Turn for a moment to the Canadian Dominion. The preamble to the
British North America Act, 1867, asserts with diplomatic inaccuracy
that the Provinces of the present Dominion have expressed their desire
to be united into one Dominion "with a constitution similar in principle
to that of the United Kingdom." If preambles were intended to express
anything like the whole truth, for the word "Kingdom" ought to have
been substituted "States": since it is clear that the Constitution of the
Dominion is in its essential features modelled on that of the Union. This
is indeed denied, but in my judgment without adequate grounds, by
competent Canadian critics... [N]o one can study the provisions of the
British North America Act, 1867, without seeing that its authors had the
American Constitution constantly before their eyes, and that if Canada
were an independent country it would be a Confederacy governed under
a Constitution very similar to that of the United States.39
The enactment of the Charter as part of the Constitution Act, 1982
expanded the limits of Parliament's power, narrowing its legislative
freedom considerably. Parliament was no longer constrained only by
subject-matter in a federal system-its laws would now be struck down
and ruled unconstitutional by the courts when they infringed new broadly
worded rights and freedoms and a series of new rules relating to institutions
and governance. The Constitution Act, 1982 made clear that all actions
taken by the state (including statutes enacted by Parliament) which were
inconsistent with any part of the Constitution would be legally invalid and
of no force or effect to the extent of the inconsistency.40 Following the
enactment of the Charter, Canadian courts did not hesitate to strike down
37. 22 & 23 Geo 5, c 4 (UK).
38. Dicey, supra note 22 at 90, 117.
39. Ibid at 161-162.
40. Constitution Act, 1982, s 35, being Schedule B to the CanadaAct 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11, s 52.
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entire statutes and parts of statutes, applying a robust interpretation of
the new constitutionally-entrenched guarantees.41 The Charter therefore
placed significant new limits on state powers and cemented the location
of Canadian sovereignty in the Constitution as opposed to a single
lawmaking institution. After 1982, any lingering doubts about the location
of Canadian sovereignty were resolved as it now clearly resided in the
Constitution as the supreme law, which created and empowered all other
lawmaking institutions.42
II. The constitutional authority for delegated legislation
1. Introduction
Given that Canada is embedded within a system of constitutional
supremacy, having a Constitution that imposes enforceable limits on
Parliament's powers, the question that follows is: what, if anything,
does the Constitution require in relation to the delegation of lawmaking
powers by Parliament to others? While there is no express provision in
the Constitution speaking directly to delegation, courts have heard and
decided constitutional challenges to Parliament's capacity to delegate
its lawmaking powers to the executive and have shed some light on
the question through the jurisprudence. This Part begins by reviewing
scholarly views on the constitutionality of delegation and then moves
to a critical assessment of the relevant case law, which focuses on a key
precedent established by the Supreme Court of Canada in 1918.
2. Scholarly views
The question ofthe constitutionality of Parliament delegating its lawmaking
powers to others has received little scholarly attention, possibly because
of what is seen as strong precedent upholding its constitutionality.43 Aside
from a brief discussion in Peter Hogg's leading constitutional law text,4 4
41. The first Supreme Court of Canada case striking down an entire statute under the Charter was R
vBigMDrugMartLtd, [1985] 1 SCR 295, 18 DLR (4th) 321.
42. Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 40, s 52(1). It should be noted that the Constitution of Canada
can be amended through six prescribed processes set out in the Charter: see ss 38, 41, 43-47 of the
Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 40.
43. In 1975, Gerard V La Forest declared that the delegation of legislative power was no longer
a "live subject" because of "greater flexibility in constitutional interpretation": Gerard V La Forest,
"Delegation of Legislative Power in Canada" (1975) 21:1 McGill U 131 at 131 (focusing on
delegation between federal and provincial legislatures). An insightful overview of the academic study
of delegated legislation in the past century can be found in Michael Taggart, "From 'Parliamentary
Powers' to Privatization: The Chequered History of Delegated Legislation in the Twentieth Century"
(2005) 55:1 UTLJ 575.
44. Peter W Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed (Toronto: Carswell, 2007) (loose-leaf
updated 2018, release 1), vol 1 at 14.1-14.3. Hogg concludes that sweeping delegations are valid on
the basis of Shannon v Lower Mainland Dairy Products Board, [1938] AC 708, [1938] 4 DLR 81
530 The Dalhousie Law Journal
a note in Ruth Sullivan's text on statutory interpretation,45 and a section
in John Keyes' book on executive legislation,46 there is only one article
exploring the question in-depth written by John Willis that appeared in a
1939 issue of the HarvardLaw Review4" and a masters' dissertation written
in 1996 by Diane McMurray, a student at the University of Ottawa.48
Willis accepted the constitutional validity of Parliament delegating its
lawmaking powers to the executive where the authority was limited to
creating ancillary legislation to complement a statutory scheme. He
opposed Parliament enacting "skeleton legislation" that would empower
the executive to "clothe the bare bones" of a statute.4 9 Nevertheless, Willis
did not advocate a change to constitutional precedent on the question of
delegation. McMurray's dissertation goes further in considering a new
approach to the constitutionality of delegation. Throughout her paper, she
builds a case against Parliament delegating its lawmaking powers to the
executive. Her analysis focuses on the mistaken application of Westminster
sovereignty to Canada, which has resulted in courts permitting legislatures
to do as they see fit with delegation. In McMurray's view, this judicially-
sanctioned latitude has led to unaccountable executive power with
worrying implications for democracy. McMurray observes that measures
that are designed to keep the executive in check have largely failed because
of cabinet's strong influence over Parliament through party discipline.
Because of its party control, the executive can essentially determine which
lawmaking powers Parliament delegates to it." McMurray writes that with
broad delegated powers, the cabinet is "free to make important policy
choices about how this country is to be governed outside the legislative
process-behind closed doors free from parliamentary scrutiny."51 She
concludes by arguing in favour of a "sacred" legislative jurisdiction that
would belong to Parliament alone, and which should be constitutionally
shielded from delegation.2 McMurray's call for reform to delegation is
[Shannon cited to DLR] (PC), discussed further below.
45. Ruth Sullivan simply notes that "[i]t is well-established that, subject to few constraints, Canadian
legislatures can delegate whatever powers they possess": Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan on the Construction
of Statutes, 6th ed (Markham: LexisNexis, 2014) at 412.
46. John Mark Keyes, Executive Legislation, 2nd ed (Markham: LexisNexis, 2010) at 109-115
discussing the relevant cases.
47. John Willis, "Administrative Law and the British North America Act" (1939) 53:2 Harv L Rev
251.
48. Diane McMurray, "Re-examining the Law-Making Power in the Canadian Constitution: A Case
for a Non-Delegation Doctrine" (LLM Thesis, University of Ottawa, 1996) [unpublished].
49. Willis, supra note 47 at 253.
50. McMurray, supra note 48 at ii.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
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powerful and insightful, although it is not clear from her work where
the line should be drawn in terms of which lawmaking powers would be
reserved only to Parliament.
3. Case law
McMurray is correct that the early case law emphasized the autonomy
of Canadian legislatures, going so far as to compare them to sovereign
parliaments. Yet the cases should be understood as less about transplanting
a robust vision of parliamentary sovereignty into Canada and more about
the courts prodding along and encouraging the development of a new
country with a distinct identity from the United Kingdom. The Privy
Council judgment in the 1883 case of Hodge v. The Queen,53 for instance,
suggests that Canadian legislatures inherited a version of parliamentary
sovereignty, which included the capacity to delegate their lawmaking
powers to others. On the facts of the case, a constitutional challenge was
brought against an Ontario statute that delegated power to the License
Commissioners of Toronto to issue tavern licenses. The challenge focused
on the argument that the enabling legislation exceeded the legislature's
competence as the subject matter of regulating taverns was not assigned to
the provincial legislatures under section 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.
In other words, the case was one related to federalism and the doctrine
of ultra vires. It is considered a watershed in constitutional law for its
articulation of the 'double aspect' doctrine, allowing a degree of subject-
matter overlap between the federal and provincial legislatures despite the
insistence of their Lordships that they "do not think it necessary in the
present case to lay down any general rule or rules for the construction of
the British North America Act."54 After upholding the constitutionality of
the Ontario statute, the Privy Council went on to consider the delegation
power. It commented in obiter dicta upon the general quality of the
lawmaking powers of the new Canadian legislatures, tating that they were
.in no sense delegates of or acting under any mandate from the Imperial
Parliament."55 The Privy Council continued:
[The British North America Act] conferred powers not in any sense to be
exercised by delegation from or as agents of the Imperial Parliament, but
authority as plenary and as ample within the limits prescribed by Sect.
92 as the Imperial Parliament in the plenitude of its power possessed
and could bestow. Within these limits of subjects and area the Local
Legislature is supreme, and has the same authority as the Imperial
53. Hodge, supra note 35.
54. Ibid at 128, 130.
55. Ibid at 132.
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Parliament, or the Parliament of the Dominion, would have had under
like circumstances to confide to a municipal institution or body of its
own creation authority to make bye-laws or resolutions as to subjects
specified in the enactment, and with the object of carrying the enactment
into operation and effect.
It is obvious that such an authority is ancillary to legislation, and without
it an attempt to provide for varying details and machinery to carry them
out might become oppressive, or absolutely fail. The... judgment of the
Court of Appeal contains abundance of precedents for this legislation
entrusting a limited discretionary authority to others, and has many
illustrations of its necessity and convenience. It was argued at the bar that
a Legislature committing important regulations to agents or delegates
effaces itself. That is not so. It retains its powers intact, and can, whenever
it pleases, destroy the agency it has created and set up another, or take
the matter directly into its own hands. How far it shall seek the aid of
subordinate agencies, and how long it shall continue them, are matters
for each Legislature, and not for courts of law, to decide.56
This dictum of the Privy Council in Hodge v. The Queen advances a
robust conception of parliamentary sovereignty that is difficult to square
with the logic and design of the Canadian constitutional framework-even
the limited skeletal framework of the Constitution Act, 1867. Scholars have
critiqued the case on this basis. For example, writing in 1976, J Noel Lyon
observed that the Privy Council effectively provided Parliament with overly
broad lawmaking latitude on the "unexamined assumption that Canadian
legislatures enjoy a supremacy of the same quality as that of the Parliament
of the United Kingdom.517 The attachment to parliamentary sovereignty
limited only by degree has proven resilient with many judgments relying
on the Privy Council's dictum for concluding that Canadian legislatures
enjoy sovereignty similar to that in the United Kingdom. Even the
Supreme Court of Canada observed in Reference re Secession of Quebec
that despite "obvious differences between the governance of Canada and
the United Kingdom," there was a "continuity of the exercise of sovereign
power transferred from Westminster to the federal and provincial capitals
of Canada."5 9 This notion of 'limited sovereignty' can be best explained
by considering the context in which these early cases were decided:
56. Ibid.
57. J Noel Lyon, "The Central Fallacy of Canadian Constitutional Law" (1976) 22:1 McGill LJ 40
at 43.
58. See, e.g., The Canadian Reform Conservative Alliance Party Portage-Lisgar Constituency
Association v Harms, 2003 MBQB 11 at para 12; Joseph Jacob Holdings Ltd v Prince George (City),
(1980), 118 DLR (3d) 243 at 248-249, [1981] 2 WWR 675 (BCSC); Micas v Attorney-General
for Saskatchewan, [1928] 3 WWR 523 at 527-529, 23 Sask LR 412 (QB); Credit Foncier Franco-
Canadien v Ross, [1937] 3 DLR 365 at 368-369, [1937] 2 WWR 353 (ABCA).
59. Reference re Secession of Quebec, supra note 32 at para 44.
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a new country was starting to develop its own identity and building its
national security after a period of colonial government and anxiety
following the American Civil War and the threat of a possible invasion
from the south. The Privy Council rightly confirmed the importance of
the Constitution Act, 1867 in placing Canada on its own path with a new
national government. The Canadian legislatures were not mere delegates
of Westminster but held a true original jurisdiction and inherent powers.
The message conveyed by the Privy Council is that the institutions created
by the Constitution were capable of forging their own way; they were
encouraged to do so within the limits imposed by the Constitution and
subject to applicable laws of the Imperial Parliament. Hodge v. The Queen
and similar cases are therefore less about the Canadian legislatures holding
a robust sovereignty free of constraints and more about encouraging the
growth and development of a Canadian identity distinct from the United
Kingdom under a new constitutional framework-through institutions that
were equipped to effectively respond to local needs and circumstances.60
The more difficult aspect of the judgment is that the Privy Council
turned to sovereignty to justify the delegation of lawmaking powers
by Parliament to the executive, the reasoning being that the sovereign
Westminster Parliament was itself capable of delegating lawmaking
powers, and by extension the somewhat sovereign Canadian legislatures
should also have this power. By adopting this reasoning, the Privy Council
failed to consider in its obiter the question of what, if anything, the
Constitution might have to say about the matter, perhaps an unsurprising
neglect of British judges sitting in the sovereign Parliament at Westminster
60. But see Shannon, supra note 44, in which the Privy Council suggested that a Diceyan conception
of sovereignty did apply to Canadian legislatures in relation to "matters falling within the classes
of subjects in relation to which the constitution has granted legislative powers" (at 87). According
to their Lordships, "[w]ithin its appointed sphere the Provincial Legislature is as supreme as any
other Parliament" (at 87). In that case, the Privy Council held that the British Columbia legislature
was empowered to delegate the regulation of producing, packing, transporting, storing and marketing
of dairy products in the province. While the Privy Council suggests there is unlimited legislative
power within subject-matter jurisdiction, their Lordships overstate the position under the written
Constitution Moreover, the delegation of lawmaking power under the Natural Products Marketing
(British Columbia) Act, Amendment Act, 1936 c 34, while broad, was not a wholesale delegation
To the extent the case can be read as suggesting an unlimited power for legislatures to delegate
their lawmaking powers to others, as has been accepted by Hogg, supra note 44 at 14.2-14.3 and
the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia in Hartling v Nova Scotia (Attorney General), 2006 NSSC 225
at paras 16-20, it should not be followed on the basis that it is per incuriam. The Privy Council set
out its full reasoning on the constitutionality of delegation in a single, dispositive paragraph without
reference to other relevant precedent hat spoke of constitutional limits such as Hodge, supra note 35
and In Re Gray, [1918] SCR 150, 42 DLR 1 [In Re Gray cited to SCR]. Such a broad proposition of
constitutional law cannot be safely or reliably extracted from this attenuated observation that fails to
engage with the relevant case law and other aspects of the Constitution.
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Palace. To their credit, though, their Lordships implied the existence of
some limits to the delegation power in Canada. First, their Lordships
speak of delegation as a power that would be "ancillary" to legislation,
arising from the practical need to fill in the details of a statutory scheme.6 1
The delegation of ancillary matters by Parliament to the executive is not
only allowable, but is expected, which raises the question of how courts
would treat substantial (not ancillary) delegations. Second, their Lordships
refer with approval to judgments of the Ontario Court of Appeal which
endorse the delegation of a "limited discretionary authority to others."62
Third, their Lordships highlight the unimpaired capacity of the legislature
to supervise the exercise of executive lawmaking and revoke or amend
delegated legislation and grants of authority at pleasure.6 This latter
point, an important theme of later court judgments, places responsibility
on Parliament to supervise the executive in making delegated legislation.
The 1918 Supreme Court of Canada judgment in In Re Gray64 remains
the leading judgment on the constitutionality of delegation. In that case,
the Supreme Court squarely addressed the question, and the judgment
is seen to have endorsed a broad capacity for Parliament to delegate its
lawmaking powers to others. In subsequent cases, Canadian courts have
cited In Re Gray as authority for accepting the constitutional validity of
any delegation of legislative powers no matter how broad. For instance,
in Sga 'nism Sim 'augit (Chief Mountain) v. Canada (Attorney General),65
the British Columbia Court of Appeal observed that "[t]he case law on
delegation of legislative powers admits of few, if any restrictions, on
the scope or content of what powers may constitutionally be delegated"
and that "there is no constitutional impediment to a sweeping delegation
of legislative powers."66 Similarly, in Hartling v. Nova Scotia (Attorney
General),6" the Nova Scotia Supreme Court saw In Re Gray as endorsing
"the constitutionality of delegating full power to legislate as opposed
to simply the power to make regulations ancillary to the legislation."68
When a challenge to this interpretation was raised in Apotex Inc v. Canada
(Health),69 the Federal Court of Appeal refused to "take a fresh look at
61. Hodge, supra note 35 at 132.
62. Ibid [emphasis added].
63. Ibid.
64. In Re Gray, supra note 60.
65. 2013 BCCA 49.
66. Ibid at paras 89, 90.
67. 2006 NSSC 225.
68. Ibid at para 18.
69. 2010 FCA 334.
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Parliament's authority to delegate.""0 Courts have also treated legislation
made by the executive as if it was itself an Act of Parliament, drawing
upon a theory of agency. For example, in R v. JP,"1 the Ontario Court
of Appeal upheld the delegation of lawmaking powers by Parliament to
the cabinet to create an access scheme for medical marijuana, holding
that "subordinate legislation in the form of regulations is as much an
expression of Parliament's will as is a provision in a statute."2 Whether
or not In Re Gray properly read actually stands for these propositions,
courts have accepted it as such and it has become an established de facto
precedent supporting the constitutional validity of near limitless delegation
of parliamentary lawmaking power to the executive.
On the facts of In Re Gray, the federal War Measures Act, 19143 was
challenged as a constitutionally impermissible delegation of Parliament's
lawmaking power to the executive. The argument against the delegation
was that it was too broad, and essentially handed over an entire swathe
of parliamentary lawmaking powers to the executive. Section 6 of the
Act granted authority to the cabinet "to do and authorize such acts and
things, and to make from time to time such orders and regulations, as
[it] may by reason of the existence of real or apprehended war, invasion
or insurrection, deem necessary or advisable for the security, defence,
peace, order and welfare of Canada...." In considering the provision,
Chief Justice Fitzpatrick distinguished Canada from the United Kingdom,
writing that a supreme Parliament "is not the case in this country, which has
its constitution founded in the Imperial statute."4 Chief Justice Fitzpatrick
then sought to locate a specific term in the Constitution Act, 1867that would
limit the capacity of Parliament to delegate its powers to the executive.75 In
Chief Justice Fitzpatrick's view, an express constitutional term would be
needed to distinguish the Canadian Parliament from that of Westminster.
7 6
After finding no such term, Chief Justice Fitzpatrick held that Parliament
enjoyed the authority to delegate its lawmaking powers to the executive
"to carry out the object of an Act, instead of setting out all the details in the
Act itself"'7 7 Nevertheless, the Constitution could impose some limits on
70. Ibid at para 63.
71. (2003), 67 OR (3d) 321 (CA), 231 DLR (4th) 179 [R vJP].
72. Ibid at para 26.
73. (1914), 5 Geo 5, c 2.
74. In Re Gray, supra note 60 at 156.
75. Ibid at 157.
76. Ibid where the Chief Justice wrote: "I cannot, however, find anything in that Constitutional Act
which, so far as material to the question now under consideration, would impose any limitation on the
authority of the Parliament of Canada to which the Imperial Parliament is not subject."
77. Ibid at 156.
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delegation. Parliament would not be permitted to abdicate its legislative
powers and could only delegate "within reasonable limits."8 As already
seen in the Privy Council's obiter in Hodge v. The Queen, Chief Justice
Fitzpatrick held that the lawmaking powers delegated by Parliament
to others "must necessarily be subject to determination at any time by
Parliament."9 In commenting on the context of the impugned statute,
Chief Justice Fitzpatrick highlighted the imminent threat of war at the
time it was enacted. He observed that the Act had been designed to "clothe
the executive with the widest powers in time of danger."8 The weight of
war on the judgment was made clear in Chief Justice Fitzpatrick's closing
lines: "[o]ur legislators were no doubt impressed in the hour of peril with
the conviction that the safety of the country is the supreme law against
which no other law can prevail. It is our clear duty to give effect to their
patriotic intention."81
Justice Duff, concurring in the result, would have imposed an even
lower standard of review. According to Justice Duff, it was not the role
of a court to consider the intention of Parliament in enacting legislation,
including the War Measures Act, 1914, because judicial speculation as to
parliamentary motives "leads into a labyrinth where there is no guide.1
82
Nevertheless, Justice Duff highlighted the statute's enactment in the
context of war which demanded "extraordinary powers be possessed by
the executive."83 Justice Duff dismissed the argument that Parliament
had abandoned its lawmaking powers on the basis that the statute did not
prevent Parliament from repealing or amending it.84 In Justice Duff's view,
when the executive made laws under delegated authority it acted as an
agent of Parliament.8
Justice Idington wrote a dissenting opinion in which he would have
found the statute unconstitutional given the broad scope of the delegation.
He considered it "startling"86 that under the delegation provision, the
executive could repeal the primary statute and "govern the country,""
subject only to "the possibility of parliament being convened once a year
78. Ibid at 157.
79. Ibid. Even if this is simply a consequence of a Canadian 'limited version' of parliamentary
sovereignty, it is still a constitutional limitation.
80. Ibid at 158.
81. Ibidat 160.
82. Ibid at 169. Notably this is no longer the case: see the discussion of the modem approach to
statutory interpretation inRizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd (Re), [1998] 1 SCR 27, 154 DLR (4th) 193.
83. In Re Gray, supra note 60 at 169.
84. Ibid at 170.
85. Ibid. See also R v JP, supra note 71.
86. In Re Gray, supra note 60 at 164.
87. Ibid at 165.
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to act and seeing fit to revoke such orders.""s In the event of a change of
government, the statute would allow a new executive to bypass Parliament
and rule by regulation.89 In Justice Idington's view, and like McMurray's
conclusion, the Constitution required Parliament itself to make important
laws-including the imposition of a military draft of every man in the
country between the ages of 18 and 60, as such a decision captured the
"mental and physical energies of every member of the entire population."9"
He wrote:
The several measures required to produce such results must be enacted
by the Parliament of Canada in a due and lawful method according to
our constitution and its entire powers thereunder cannot be by a single
stroke of the pen surrendered or transferred to anybody.... [A] wholesale
surrender of the will of the people to any autocratic power is exactly
what we are fighting against.9'
A number of observations can be made about In Re Gray. At the
outset, the language used by Chief Justice Fitzpatrick is consistent with the
limits to delegation implicitly contained in the obiter of the Privy Council
in Hodge v. The Queen. Chief Justice Fitzpatrick's judgment in no sense
imparts an absolute power for Parliament to delegate its lawmaking powers
to others. Instead, the Constitution Act, 1867 imposed at least two limits.
First, Parliament could not abdicate its lawmaking powers by giving them
away wholesale to the executive. According to Chief Justice Fitzpatrick
and Justice Duff, Parliament would abdicate its powers if it was no longer
capable of amending or repealing the delegation. The continuing availability
of parliamentary supervision, and to the degree necessary, control of the
executive alleviated concern about the executive usurping Parliament, a
point also made by the Privy Council in Hodge v. The Queen. Second,
according to Chief Justice Fitzpatrick, delegation of legislative power must
made be within reasonable limits. The question is: what will be seen by the
courts as an unreasonable and thus unconstitutional delegation? It may be
argued that the Supreme Court's upholding of the sweeping delegation at
issue in In Re Gray suggests that anything equal or less in degree can be
safely presumed reasonable and thus unassailable. While appealing, this
88. Ibid at 165.
89. Ibid at 166.
90. Ibid at 165.
91. Ibid. Note that in addition to Chief Justice Fitzpatrick and Justices Duff and Idington, three other
judges sat on the case. At 175-176 of the judgment, ibid, Justice Anglin agreed with the majority in
finding that the delegation provision was constitutional on the basis that within its subject-matter
jurisdiction, Parliament held complete sovereignty (citing Hodge, supra note 35 for support). Justice
Davies agreed with Justice Anglin. Justice Brodeau agreed with Justice Idington's dissent.
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argument ignores that the judgment is shot through with judicial anxiety
over national security. The context of the case was imminent war, a national
crisis and an existential threat to a country not yet 50 years old. It stands
to reason that the very same delegation of lawmaking power in section 6
of the War Measures Act, 1914 might not be viewed as reasonable outside
the context of an exceptional national security threat, a position reinforced
by Chief Justice Fitzpatrick's observation that delegated powers were
normally used by Parliament o fill in the details of a statute to further the
Act's object.92 As in other areas of the law, what is reasonable will turn
on the circumstances, which calls for the court to examine the relevant
facts to determine whether the delegation can withstand constitutional
muster. The starting point is that the delegation of lawmaking power to
the executive will be presumed reasonable if it is limited to authorizing
the executive to fill in the details of a statute to further its purpose, as this
is its expected use. A departure from this ordinary use would require some
kind of extraordinary and compelling justification put forward by the state,
such as the exigencies of a national emergency as in In Re Gray.
The Supreme Court of Canada confirmed its majority holding in In Re
Gray in the 1943 Chemicals Reference case.93 On the facts of the case, a
constitutional challenge was brought against the parliamentary delegation
of lawmaking authority to the executive to regulate the use of chemicals.
While the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the relevant
aspects of the statute, the judges emphasized the role of Parliament in
holding the executive to account by supervising and controlling the
exercise of delegated authority. For example, Chief Justice Duff held that
while there is a "risk of abuse when wide powers are committed in general
terms to any body of men," it was clear from the statute that Parliament had
not abandoned its control of the executive.94 The delegation provisions did
not "transform the Executive Government into a legislature, in the sense
in which the Parliament of Canada and the legislatures of the provinces are
legislatures."95 Justice Rinfret, writing for himself and Justice Taschereau,
reiterated that "Parliament retains its power intact and can, whenever it
pleases, take the matter directly into its own hands.96 On the question
of whether Parliament had abdicated its powers, Justice Rinfret held
92. In Re Gray, supra note 60 at 156.
93. Reference as to the Validity of the Regulations in Relation to Chemicals Enacted by Order in
Council and of an Order of the Controller of Chemicals Made Pursuant Thereto, [1943] SCR 1, [1943]
1 DLR 248 [cited to SCR].
94. Ibid at 12.
95. Ibid at 13.
96. Ibidat 18.
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that there was no evidence of an intention for Parliament to abandon
legislative control in the subject matter. Moreover, Parliament had "made
no abandonment of control, in fact."9 Similarly, Justice Davis observed
that while it was concerning to see "the most extensive and drastic powers
of control into the hands of individuals or boards who are in no way
responsive to the will of the electorate," there remained a safety valve
in that "the House of Commons as representative of the people has, in a
practical sense, full power to amend or repeal" any delegated legislation
that would be made by the executive.98 Likewise, Justice Kerwin dismissed
concerns about the broad lawmaking powers that had been given to the
executive, writing that "[i]f at any time Parliament considers that too great
a power has been conferred upon the Governor in Council, the remedy lies
in its own hands."99 The judgment reiterates In Re Gray in that Parliament
holds the constitutional authority to delegate considerable lawmaking
powers to the executive, provided the delegation does not amount to an
abdication of its lawmaking role. If Parliament is capable of maintaining
supervisory control over the exercise of delegated authority, the delegation
will not be viewed as an abdication.
Less than a decade after the Chemical Reference, the Supreme Court
of Canada decided Attorney General of Nova Scotia v. Attorney General
of Canada.1 On the facts of the case, the delegation of certain lawmaking
powers by a provincial legislature to the federal Parliament was challenged
as being unconstitutional. The Supreme Court agreed. It held that
delegation from one level of legislature to another violated the principle
of federalism. According to the Supreme Court, horizontal delegation
disrupted the federal balance between legislatures that was struck by the
Constitution Act, 1867. Chief Justice Rinfret held that although Canadian
legislatures were "sovereign within their sphere defined by The British
North America Act," they did not have unlimited capabilities as they were
limited by constitutional bounds."' He wrote:
The country is entitled to insist that legislation adopted under section 91
should be passed exclusively by the Parliament of Canada in the same
way as the people of each Province are entitled to insist that legislation
concerning the matters enumerated in section 92 should come exclusively
from their respective Legislatures. In each case the Members elected to
97. Ibid.
98. Ibid at 25-26.
99. Ibid at 30.
100. [1951] SCR 31, [1950] 4 DLR 369 [cited to SCR].
101. Ibid at 33-44 (effectively making the point that they do not enjoy true Diceyan parliamentary
sovereignty).
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Parliament or to the Legislatures are the only ones entrusted with the
power and the duty to legislate concerning the subjects exclusively
distributed by the constitutional Act to each of them.
No power of delegation is expressed either in section 91 or in section
92, nor, indeed, is there to be found the power of accepting delegation
from one body to the other; and I have no doubt that if it had been the
intention to give such powers it would have been expressed in clear and
unequivocal anguage....
[T]he word "exclusively" used both in section 91 and in section 92
indicates a settled line of demarcation and it does not belong to either
Parliament, or the Legislatures, to confer powers upon the other.1
2
The passage is striking as many of the points made by Chief Justice
Rinfret would seem to apply to the delegation of legislative power
from Parliament to the executive-particularly the observation that the
Constitution Act, 1867 did not expressly empower Parliament to delegate
its lawmaking powers to others. The judgment also reiterates that the
elected members of Parliament are the only individuals entrusted by the
Constitution with the power to make federal laws. Chief Justice Rinfret
dismissed this comparison, writing that lawmaking powers delegated
by Parliament to the executive were "of a character different from [this]
delegation."1" 3 While it is certainly true that federalism is an animating
feature of the Constitution, as discussed earlier, the rejection of the obvious
analogy between horizontal and vertical delegation without further
justification for their differential treatment is unsatisfactory. Why does
delegation from one legislature to another require express constitutional
authorization while delegation from Parliament to the executive rely on
the inverse starting point of the Constitution not ruling it out? Why does
delegated legislation not undermine trust in the elected members of the
legislatures as it does in the case of delegation between legislatures? In both
cases, Parliament retains its supervisory powers intact, including its ability
to control the exercise of delegated power. Why is this emphasized only
in the case of delegation to the executive? While it may be that horizontal
delegation between the provinces and the federal Parliament implies the
control of one legislature by the other, any delegation would presumably
be made with the consent of both legislatures-and the actual exercise of
any delegated powers would be expected to occur through a lawmaking
partnership and mutual consent else risk revocation. The hollowness of the
differential treatment is telling as following the Supreme Court's judgment,
102. Ibid at 34 [emphasis added].
103. Ibid at 35.
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the provincial legislatures and Parliament quickly worked around this
limitation by taking advantage of the judicial acceptance of delegation to
the executive: executive agencies were established to receive and exercise
both federal and provincial lawmaking powers concurrently. 104
III. Contemporary constitutional interpretation
1. Introduction
This Part begins by setting out the living tree interpretive approach to the
Constitution, which is grounded in a large, liberal and purposive reading
of the constitutional text that facilitates its evolution over time in response
to new circumstances. Courts play the key role in this adaptive process by
interpreting constitutional norms in relation to the facts of individual cases.
The exercise is a balancing act. On the one hand, judges value certainty
and predictability, which weigh in favour of following past precedent and
making only incremental constitutional change. On the other hand, judges
seek to reconcile constitutional principles with social realities to promote
the relevance of the Constitution, which weighs in favour of an expansive
constitutional interpretation. This Part critically reviews the approach
of the Supreme Court of Canada in In Re Gray from the perspective of
the living tree which brings into sharp contrast the narrow and technical
interpretation of the Constitution adopted by the judicial majority in
that case. This outmoded interpretive approach as resulted in a stunted
constitutional conception of Parliament, which does little to safeguard its
role as the chief democratic, representative and accountable lawmaking
institution in Canada.
2. The living tree approach
Early Canadian courts adopted a narrow reading of the constitutional
text, treating it like the text of an ordinary statute. The Persons Case is
illustrative.0 5 In that case, the unanimous Supreme Court of Canada0 6 held
that the words "qualified persons" in the Constitution Act, 1867 referred
exclusively to men, with the consequence that women were ineligible
for appointment to the Senate. According to Chief Justice Anglin, the
Supreme Court was disinterested in the question of the desirability of
women Senators. Instead, the judges were called upon "to construe, to
104. See, e.g., PEIPotatoMarketingBoardv Willis, [1952] 2 SCR 392, [1952] 4 DLR 146 (delegation
of federal powers to a provincial board upheld as constitutional).
105. For a detailed scholarly treatment of the case see Robert J Sharpe & Patricia I McMahon, The
Persons Case: The Origins and Legacy of the Fight for Legal Personhood (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 2007).
106. Reference re meaning of the word "'Persons" in s. 24 of British North AmericaAct, [1928] SCR
276, 1928 4 DLR 98 [Persons Case SCC cited to SCR].
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the best of our ability, the relevant portions of the [Constitution Act,
1867], and upon that construction to base our answer."' In other words,
giving meaning to the Constitution was a simple and neutral exercise in
statutory interpretation. Chief Justice Anglin held that the existing male-
only common law definition had been imported into the provisions of the
Constitution Act, 1867. Women were therefore ineligible to be named as
Senators."8 The Privy Council reversed. In its decision,"0 9 their Lordships
came to the view that "qualified persons" included both men and women.
Lord Sankey held that past precedent, including both Roman and English
authorities, was "not of itself a secure foundation on which to build the
interpretation of the [Constitution Act, 1867]." ' He noted that former
British colonies encompassed peoples at "every stage of social, political
and economic development and undergoing a continuous process of
evolution.111 Lord Sankey then penned his famous dictum on the proper
interpretative approach to the Constitution:
[The Constitution Act, 1867] planted in Canada a living tree capable of
growth and expansion within its natural limits. The object of the Act was
to grant a Constitution to Canada. ... Their Lordships do not conceive it
to be the duty of this Board-it is certainly not their desire-to cut down
the provisions of the Act by a narrow and technical construction, but
rather to give it a large and liberal interpretation so that the Dominion
to a great extent, but within certain fixed limits, may be mistress in her
own house... 112
The living tree has since become the leading approach to constitutional
interpretation in Canada.13 In applying the living tree, courts seek to give
meaning to the constitutional text in light of the realities and exigencies
of contemporary society. This goal is accomplished by stepping back
from the technical rules of statutory construction to consider the rationale
of the constitutional elements that together form a basic structure or
architecture.14 The living tree calls upon courts to "determine and give
107. Ibid at 281-282.
108. Ibid at 290.
109. [1930] AC 124, [1930] 1 DLR 98 [cited to AC].
110. Ibid at 132.
111. Ibid.
112. Ibid at 133.
113. R v Blais, 2003 SCC 44 at para 40. For a commentary on selective cases in which the living
tree doctrine was applied see Will Walachow, "The Living Tree" in Peter Oliver, Patrick Macklem
& Nathalie Des Rosiers, eds, The Oxford Handbook of the Canadian Constitution (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2017), ch 42.
114. See Re Residential Tenancies Act, [1981] 1 SCR 714 at 723, 123 DLR (3d) 554 [cited to SCR];
Reference re Provincial Election Boundaries (Saskatchewan), [1991] 2 SCR 158 at 180, 81 DLR
(4th) 16; Law Society of Upper Canada v Skapinker, [1984] 1 SCR 357 at 366, 9 DLR (4th) 161
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effect to the broad objectives and purposes of the Constitution."'115 Through
progressive interpretation, the living tree promotes constitutional evolution
and the "structuring the exercise of power by the organs of the state in
times vastly different from those in which it was crafted."'116 While courts
are encouraged to adopt a liberal interpretation, the Constitution is not an
empty vessel that depends upon judicial discretion in each new case.117 It
should grow and expand only within its "natural limits" as observed by
Lord Sankey.118 The Supreme Court has cautioned judges not to "invent
new obligations foreign to the original purpose of the provision at issue."119
Giving a broad and purposive meaning to the constitutional text in light
of the social context must also be balanced against the important values of
legal predictability and certainty, which weigh in favour of a constrained
interpretation.120 A provision's history and its past interpretations operate
to limit interpretive discretion.2 The case law demonstrates that courts
are reluctant to use the living tree to impose major new obligations on
the state (particularly those carrying cost implications).12 At the same
time, however, the Constitution should not stand in the way of progressive
policies that would have been beyond the contemplation of the framers.123
[Skapinker]; and Reference re Senate Reform, 2014 SCC 32 at para 26 [Reference re Senate Reform].
This approach may require the court to consider social science evidence, which often comes to the
court through intervenors: for a critical assessment see, e.g., Ian Brodie, Friends of the Court: The
Privileging of Interest Group Litigants in Canada (Albany: State University of New York Press,
2002). For a comparative view see Lorne Neudorf, "Intervention at the UK Supreme Court" (2013) 2
Cambridge J Intl & Comparative L 16.
115. Re Residential Tenancies Act, supra note 114 at 723. See also Hunter v Southam, [1984] 2 SCR
145 at 156-157, 11 DLR (4th) 641 per Dickson J.
116. Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, 2004 SCC 79 at para 23 [Reference re Same-Sex Marriage].
117. Bradley W Miller has pointed out that he living tree approach may not be incompatible with
originalism: see Bradley W Miller, "Beguiled by Metaphors: The 'Living Tree' and Originalist
Constitutional Interpretation in Canada" (2009) 22:2 Can JL & Jur 331.
118. See Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 116 at paras 26-28, where the Supreme Court
held that it was not a task of the judiciary to work out the natural limits to constitutional expansion in
the abstract. Instead, the burden fell to the party advancing a restrictive constitutional interpretation to
identify an "objective core of meaning" that would have a limiting effect.
119. R v Blais, supra note 113 at para 40.
120. Skapinker, supra note 114 at 366. See also the restrictive judicial use of constitutional exemptions
to mandatory minimum sentences partly on the basis of certainty and predictability: R v Ferguson,
2008 SCC 6.
121. See, e.g., Aileen Kavanagh, "The Idea of a Living Constitutionf' (2003) 16 Can JL & Jur 55
(arguing that the living tree encompasses incremental change because of significant constraints on
judicial discretion). See also R v Blais, supra note 113 at para 40.
122. Auton (Guardian ad litem ofi v British Columbia (Attorney General), 2004 SCC 78 rejecting a
Charter claim for the funding of a certain medical treatment for preschool-aged autistic children.
123. See, e.g., Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 116, especially at paras 22-23, 26-28.
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3. The approach of In Re Gray
The Supreme Court of Canada's judgment in In Re Gray can be critiqued
from the perspective of the living tree approach to reveal the extent
of the narrow and technical reading of the Constitution by the judicial
majority.124 In his reasons, Chief Justice Fitzpatrick applied the English
precedent of R v. Halliday25 in support of Parliament's capacity to
delegate lawmaking powers to the executive. He observed that in R v.
Halliday, their Lordships relied upon the United Kingdom Parliament's
"absolute power untrammeled by any written instrument1 26 in coming to
the view that it could delegate its powers to others, a position in contrast
with the Canadian Parliament that was created and limited by a written
Constitution.1 2' After noting this key difference, Chief Justice Fitzpatrick
searched the text of the Constitution Act, 1867 for a provision that
would restrict delegation.1 28 Finding none, he declared delegation to be
constitutional in Canada. This approach cuts against the grain of the living
tree as it adopts a purely textual reading of the Constitution instead of
considering broader constitutional objectives or its underlying architecture
that relate to the role and function of Parliament. Furthermore, Chief
Justice Fitzpatrick's textualist approach does not see the Constitution as
capable of growth and expansion. Under Chief Justice Fitzpatrick's view,
unless the text expressly provided otherwise, the Canadian constitutional
order was anchored to that of the United Kingdom.
Justice Duff focused on the ordinary techniques of statutory
interpretation as it was "the function of a court of law to give effect to the
enactments of a legislature according to the force of the language which the
legislature has finally chosen for the purpose of expressing its intention.
1 29
Justice Duff cited precedent o find that the delegation at issue was framed
broadly enough to authorize the executive to make regulations "concerning
any subject falling within the legislative jurisdiction of parliament.
1 30
Justice Duff found that the grant of authority was so broad it would even
124. It should be noted that In Re Gray was decided more than a decade before the Privy Council's
adoption of the living tree metaphor in the Persons Case. In Re Gray therefore adopted the prevailing
approach to the interpretation of the Constitution at the time it was decided. The critique offered in
this section seeks to demonstrate the extent of its narrow and technical approach that has resulted in a
limited constitutional conception of the role of Parliament.
125. [1917] AC 260.
126. Ibid at 271, emphasis added.
127. In Re Gray, supra note 60 at 157.
128. Ibid.
129. Ibid at 169.
130. Ibid at 166 (with the exception that he grant of authority was subject o the duration of the war,
or be at a time of apprehended war). Justice Duff also found that the context of the statute confirmed
that Parliament intended to delegate sweeping powers: ibid at 168-169.
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allow the cabinet o amend primary legislation-commonly referred to as
a Henry VIII clause. Nevertheless, he held that it was a "very extravagant
description" for counsel to have argued that the delegation amounted to an
abdication of Parliament's legislative authority.3 On its terms, the grant
of power could only be used in the case of real or apprehended war and
measures taken must be "advisable."' Like Chief Justice Fitzpatrick,
Justice Duff cited R v. Halliday for the proposition that regulations were
not constitutionally limited to complementing a statutory scheme but
could also be used to amend primary legislation if allowed by the words
of the delegation.33 None of this was constitutionally concerning. Justice
Duff found that the constitutional order remained intact as Parliament was
capable of revoking the original delegation or a regulation made under
it. 134 Citing Maitland, Justice Duff held that the executive acted as an agent
of Parliament, which meant hat regulations were equivalent as a source of
law to primary legislation.35 Justice Duff's approach to the Constitution is
clearly inconsistent with the living tree. While he wrote of a constitutional
balance, Justice Duff envisioned the judicial role as a mechanistic one to
simply give effect to statutes including those that delegated lawmaking
power-a view that misapplies parliamentary sovereignty to Canada.
Furthermore, Justice Duff refused to think more broadly about the role
of Parliament under the Constitution Act, 1867. The passing reference
to Maitland's agency theory to rebuff counsel's objections to delegation
failed to consider why agency should be applicable in the Canadian
constitutional context. The question of agency in delegation, being the idea
that the executive steps into the shoes of Parliament in making regulations,
would require a purposive analysis of the Constitution to consider its
compatibility. Finally, the fact that Justice Duff upheld a Henry VIII clause
that permitted the executive to broaden the scope of its own powers in
the absence of the safeguards of the parliamentary process is especially
concerning, as such a clause could be used to usurp Parliament. Such
provisions avoid all constitutional checks and balances and should be held
unconstitutional. 136
131. Ibid at 170.
132. Ibid. Notably, both of these conditions were to be assessed by the cabinet itself.
133. Ibid at 167-168.
134. Ibid at 170.
135. Ibid. While both primary legislation and regulations have the force of law, it is of course clear
in the UK that primary legislation cannot be legally invalidated while secondary legislation may be
quashed by a court on the basis of the ultra vires doctrine where it exceeds the scope of authority from
the enabling legislation.
136. Justice Campbell in Ontario Public School Boards 'Association v Ontario (Attorney General)
(1997), 151 DLR (4th) 346 at para 51, 45 CRR (2d) 341 (ONSC) wrote that an authorization for
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Only Justice Idington in dissent ook a broader view ofthe constitutional
architecture and saw that the Constitution Act, 1867 placed Parliament
at the centre of federal lawmaking, which limited its ability to delegate
its legislative powers to others outside of Parliament.13 While he did not
develop this argument in detail, it is evident from the judgment that that he
saw certain policy choices as being reserved exclusively to the deliberative
process of Parliament and incapable of delegation to the executive.
The consequence of In Re Gray and its narrow and technical approach
to reading the constitutional text has been a stunted conception of the
role and purpose of Parliament. While the judgment imposes some limits
to delegation (abdication and delegation within reasonable limits), it is
now largely an anachronism, a case that was decided for a young country
facing the threat of imminent war. In the century since, the Canadian
constitutional landscape has been reshaped: the living tree is the leading
interpretive approach and has spawned major doctrinal developments that
have given life to the constitutional text. In addition, the transformative
enactment of the Charter in 1982 clothed the basic structure of the
Constitution Act, 1867 and advanced a more complete vision of democratic,
representative and accountable lawmaking in Canada. In Re Gray now
finds itself sitting uneasily in the repertoire of world-class constitutional
jurisprudence produced by the Supreme Court of Canada.138 In addition,
the judgment has produced problematic outcomes. It is responsible for
questionable doctrines, uch as the differential treatment of horizontal and
vertical delegation. It also provides support for Henry VIII clauses. The
judicial endorsement of the sweeping delegation of lawmaking powers
to the executive has contributed to a system of modem lawmaking that is
dependent upon executive discretion and lawmaking in secret with few
checks and balances. The ease by which Parliament can delegate its powers
to the executive has eroded the lawmaking role of Parliament as it has
facilitated the shift of tremendous legislative power into the hands of the
executive. To the extent it allows courts to accept the validity of nearly all
delegation provisions with little meaningful controls, In Re Gray should
no longer be followed. While certainty and predictability are important
values that favour following precedent, the time has come for the courts
the executive to amend primary legislation is "constitutionally suspect because it confers upon
the government the unprotected authority to pull itself up by its own legal bootstraps and override
arbitrarily, with no further advice from the Legislative Assembly, and no right to be heard by those who
may be adversely affected by the change, the very legislative instrument from which the government
derives its original authority."
137. In Re Gray, supra note 60 at 165.
138. See, e.g., Ehud Barak, "A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy"
(2002) 116:1 Harv L Rev 19 at 111-112.
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to reassess the constitutional foundation of delegated legislation and adopt
measures to safeguard the constitutional role of Parliament.
IV. Charting a new way forward
1. Introduction
This Part begins by reassessing the constitutional foundation of delegated
legislation in Canada by applying a living tree interpretation to the
Constitution on the question of Parliament delegating its lawmaking powers
to others. The result is a new view of delegation that respects Parliament's
constitutional role as lawmaker in chief and its democratic, representative
and accountable qualities. It argues that the Constitution supports, and
indeed requires, delegation to be taken more seriously by both the courts
and Parliament. It then provides an overview of existing practices to the
judicial review of the vires of regulations and the parliamentary scrutiny
of regulations. Each is shown to be problematic. Reforms are proposed
to overcome these shortcomings. These reforms include strengthening
the judicial review of the vires of regulations and developing effective
parliamentary mechanisms to supervise and scrutinize the exercise of
delegated lawmaking powers. The Constitution provides the impetus
for these reforms as they stand to better protect the lawmaking role of
Parliament and provide important checks and balances, particularly in the
context of a Parliament controlled by the executive that can use that control
to delegate lawmaking powers to itself The reforms offer a practical and
workable solution with sufficient flexibility while ensuring that Parliament
is responsible for the formulation of national policy and continues to play
an active role in lawmaking. While scholars tend to characterize controls
of delegated legislation as focused on substance or procedure,139 policy or
legality,141 merits or technical aspects,1 41 the reforms do not easily fit into
this paradigm as they take a broader, holistic view of what is needed to
restore the constitutional balance.
2. The constitutional impetus for reform
There are a number of good reasons for courts and Parliament to take
delegation more seriously, and to move forward with reforms that will
safeguard Parliament's constitutional role and restore the constitutional
139. Gabrielle Appleby & Joanna Howe, "Scrutinising Parliament's Scrutiny of Delegated Legislative
Power" (2015) 15:1 OUCJL 3 and Andrew Edgar, "Judicial Review of Delegated Legislation: Why
Favour Substantive Review over Procedural Review?" in John Bell et al, eds, Public Law Adjudication
in Common Law Systems: Process and Substance (Oxford: Hart, 2016) 189.
140. Edward C Page, Governing by Numbers: Delegated Legislation and Everyday Policy-Making
(Oxford: Hart, 2001).
141. Tucker, supra note 2.
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balance. Under the living tree approach, courts take a large, liberal and
progressive interpretation of the Constitution. In Reference re Senate
Reform,142 the unanimous Supreme Court held that "the Constitution must
be interpreted with a view to discerning the structure of government that
it seeks to implement."143 Courts are guided by "assumptions that underlie
the text," which considers how the various elements work together
to form a constitutional architecture.144 Applying this approach to the
question of delegation would move courts beyond their impoverished
view of Parliament in the case law, which currently sees Parliament as
a simple lawmaking mechanism that can transfer its powers to anyone
in a line of statutory text. This attenuated view fails to engage with how
the Constitution sees Parliament: as a key part of the basic constitutional
architecture, possessing democratic, representative and accountable
qualities and as the key player in bringing together different constituencies
to formulate national policy and resolve pressing questions facing the
country as a whole.
On the question of delegation, the constitutional text is silent. But
this silence does not mean that the Constitution can have nothing to say
on the question. The act of delegation involves Parliament lending its
exclusively vested lawmaking powers to a body that operates outside the
strictures of the parliamentary process. Delegation must be reconciled
with the role, function and purpose of Parliament as these are envisioned
by the Constitution. What is Parliament's role? The Constitution Act,
1867 establishes Parliament as the chief lawmaker for the country as a
whole. Section 91 vests Parliament with exclusive legislative authority to
make laws in thirty subject matters and laws for the peace, order and good
government of the country. It establishes a power-sharing arrangement
by allocating federal legislative power to Parliament's three components,
namely the Queen, the Senate, and the House of Commons. By explicitly
mentioning these entities, section 91 reiterates that each is to play a part in
the lawmaking process. The centrality of Parliament to federal lawmaking
is not just seen in section 91 but is reflected throughout the text of the
Constitution Act, 1867.145 The historical record reinforces the constitutional
design of Parliament to decide questions of national policy, demonstrating
142. Reference re Senate Reform, supra note 114.
143. Ibid at para 26.
144. Ibid.
145. Among others, Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 1, s 12 (Parliament may alter the exercise of
executive power by the Governor General), s 18 (Parliament has the power to define the privileges,
powers and immunities of the Senate and House of Commons), ss 40-41 (Parliament has the power to
alter electoral districts and qualifications for election).
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how this key institution was created to bring together the country and
forge a new national identity. Sir John A Macdonald, a leading architect
of the Constitution and later Canada's first Prime Minister, advocated a
constitutional settlement that would avoid the "weakness of the American
system.1146 Parliament was designed by its framers to overcome what was
seen as the fatal defect of the United States Constitution that had resulted
in the Civil War-the extensive powers reserved to individual states. The
Canadian Parliament was instead to be a consolidated body that enjoyed
lawmaking powers in subject matters of national interest, and for the
peace, order and good government of Canada,141 to bring the new country
together. 148 While operating under the constraints of a written constitution,
Parliament would be a robust legislature reflecting "one people and one
government.1149 In Macdonald's view, Parliament would be much more
than "merely a point of authority connecting us to a limited and insufficient
extent."150 Parliament's purpose was to resolve the "great questions which
affect the general interests of the Confederacy as a whole." '51
The sweeping delegation of Parliament's legislative powers to a
body outside of Parliament risks undermining Parliament's constitutional
role. Delegation permits important decisions that affect the country as a
whole to be made through a process that excludes Parliament and does not
embody the qualities of Parliament that are reflected in the Constitution
-specifically its democratic, representative and accountable qualities.152
These qualities explain why Parliament was placed by the framers at
the centre of federal lawmaking: the House of Commons is made up of
hundreds of democratically elected members, and is the only House of
146. Provincial Parliament of Canada, Parliamentary Debates on the Subject of the Confederation
of the British North American Provinces (Quebec: Hunter, Rose & Co, 1865) at 41 [Parliamentary
Debates].
147. Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 1, s 91.
148. Parliamentary Debates, supra note 146 at 33: "Ever since the union was formed the difficulty
of what is called 'State Rights' has existed, and this had much to do in bringing on the present
unhappy war in the United States. They commenced, in fact, at the wrong end. They declared by their
Constitution that each state was a sovereignty in itself, and that all the powers incident to sovereignty
belonged to each state, except those powers which, by the Constitution, were conferred upon the
General Government and Congress. Here we have adopted a different system. We have strengthened
the General Government. We have given the General Legislature all the great subjects of legislation




151. Ibid at 40.
152. While these principles may not be fully realized in practice, they are nevertheless foundational
attributes of Parliament as an institution.
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Parliament in which a money bill can be initiated;153 the Senate includes
regional representation from the four regions of Ontario, Quebec, the
Maritime provinces and the Western provinces, and came to "represent
various groups that were under-represented in the House of Commons...
[serving] as a forum for ethnic, gender, religious, linguistic, and Aboriginal
groups that did not always have a meaningful opportunity to present
their views through the popular democratic process";154 and the public
process for enacting legislation in each House includes three readings,
opposition debate, detailed committee study, a mechanism for amending
bills and ultimately a vote. The enactment of the Charter reinforced these
qualities. While it further limited Parliament's lawmaking powers, the
Charter advanced a vision of the constitutional architecture with an even
more democratic, representative and accountable role for Parliament:
each citizen is guaranteed the right to vote and run for parliamentary
elections;55 Parliament must be dissolved for a fresh election every five
years;56 there must be a sitting of Parliament to transact business at least
once every 12 months;57 and English and French are guaranteed equality
of status in their use in all institutions of Parliament.58 The Supreme
Court of Canada's jurisprudence affirms this constitutional vision and
reiterates an evolving set of democratic norms of which Parliament plays
the key role. In Figueroa v. Canada (Attorney General),59 a majority of
the Supreme Court observed that the text of the right to vote appears to
simply guarantee that each citizen can place a ballot in a box.60 Taking
a purposive approach, however, the majority held that the guarantee was
more robust. It meant that each citizen was entitled not only to vote but
to play a meaningful role in the selection of their representatives to the
legislature, which was necessary to maintain the free and democratic state
contemplated by the Charter.161 In Reference re Secession of Quebec,
162
the unanimous Supreme Court noted the importance of democratic and
representative institutions to Canada's system of government. The Court
153. Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 1, s 53.
154. Reference re Senate Reform, supra note 114 at para 16 referring to Benoit Pelletier, "Reponses
suggerees aux questions soulevees par le renvoi a la Cour supreme du Canada concernant la reforme
du Senat" (2013) 43 RGD 445.
155. Charter, supra note 20, s 3.
156. Ibid, s 4(1).
157. Ibid, s 5.
158. Ibid, ss 16(1), 17(1), 18(1), 20(1).
159. 2003 SCC 37 [Figeuroa].
160. Ibid at para 19 citing Dixon v British Columbia (Attorney General), [1989] 4 WWR 393 at 403,
59 DLR (4th) 247 (BCSC).
161. Figeuroa, supra note 159 at paras 25-26.
162. Supra note 32.
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held that democracy was one of four unwritten principles that formed the
"lifeblood" of the Constitution.163 According to the Court:
[T]he democracy principle can best be understood as a sort of baseline
against which the framers of our Constitution, and subsequently, our
elected representatives under it, have always operated. It is perhaps for
this reason that the principle was not explicitly identified in the text of
the Constitution Act, 1867 itself. To have done so might have appeared
redundant, even silly, to the framers.
64
None of these qualities are assured in the case of laws made by the
executive. While the cabinet includes elected members of the House of
Commons from the governing party, 165 it may also include appointed
Senators. There is no guarantee of regional representation as the selection
of cabinet is a prerogative of the Prime Minister.166 Finally, key parts
of the executive lawmaking process are carried out in secret with its
deliberations being privileged from disclosure as cabinet confidences.
According to Jeremy Waldron, legislatures have a "transparent dedication
to lawmaking" in the sense of being known as the place where laws are
made.16' This explicit dedication provides accountability and directs the
efforts and resources of those who wish to change the law into the venue
dedicated to the task. 168 The same cannot be said about executive lawmaking
as the process is opaque and poorly understood.169 In addition, lawmaking
carried out in secret challenges the principle of legality as accountability
for policy choices can be avoided by making decisions covertly through
delegated legislation. In effect, the delegation of broad powers that enable
important policy matters to be decided by the executive gives the go-by to
Parliament as lawmaker in chief, undermining its constitutional functions
and purpose and the very qualities that make it uniquely qualified to decide
important questions of national policy.
There are at least two additional constitutional arguments supporting a
new approach to delegation. First, he rule of law is often seen to incorporate
a minimum standard of lawmaking transparency and accountability
that is difficult to reconcile with a lawmaking process carried out by
163. Ibid at para 51.
164. Ibid at para 62. Democracy is identified as core constitutional feature that is to be furthered when
interpreting the Constitution: Reference re Senate Reform, supra note 114 at para 25.
165. Jeremy Waldron notes the importance of large numbers in legislatures: Jeremy Waldron,
"Representative Lawmaking" (2009) 89:2 BUL Rev 335 at 340-345.
166. Guergis v Novak, 2013 ONCA 449.
167. Waldron, supra note 165 at 336.
168. Ibid at 339.
169. See, at the provincial level, the scathing report of the Ombudsman of Ontario in relation to a
regulation enacted in connection with the 2010 G20 summit in Toronto: G20 Report, supra note 18.
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the executive in secret. According to the unanimous Supreme Court of
Canada in Reference re Secession of Quebec, democracy would not exist
without the rule of law, as law provides the institutional framework that is
necessary to realize democracy."'0 In order to maintain their legitimacy, the
democratic institutions created by law "must allow for the participation of,
and accountability to, the people."' Jeremy Waldron also links the rule
of law and democratic institutions-specifically, the legislative process,
writing that "if the rule of law requires that law be taken seriously and held
in high regard in a society, one would think that particular emphasis should
be given to the legitimacy of the processes by which legislatures enact
statutes."' 2 The acceptance of broad delegated powers that are exercised
through an opaque lawmaking process is inconsistent with this notion
of the rule of law."3 Second, while the separation of powers is never a
straightforward fit with a Westminster parliamentary system that involves
some degree of overlap among the various branches of government, the
Supreme Court of Canada has articulated a form of the separation of
powers as a constitutional doctrine based on "core competencies" that
have evolved in the different branches."4 In the 2013 judgment of Ontario
v. Criminal Lawyers 'Association of Ontario,"5 a majority of the Supreme
Court held that:
Over several centuries of transfonnation and conflict, the English system
evolved from one in which power was centralized in the Crown to one
in which the powers of the state were exercised by way of distinct
organs with separate functions. The development of separate executive,
legislative and judicial functions has allowed for the evolution of certain
core competencies in the various institutions vested with these functions.
The legislative branch makes policy choices, adopts laws and holds the
purse strings of government, as only it can authorize the spending of
public funds. The executive implements and administers those policy
choices and laws with the assistance of a professional public service. The
170. Reference re Secession of Quebec, supra note 32 at para 67.
171. Ibid.
172. Jeremy Waldron, "Legislation and the Rule of Law" (2007) 1:1 Legisprudence 91 at 99.
173. See, e.g., Peter Aucoin, Mark Jarvis & Lori Turnbull, Democratizing the Constitution:
Reforming Responsible Government (Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications, 2011) where the
authors observe that the executive branch, headed by the Prime Minister, has grown in power while
the functions of the House of Commons have diminished.
174. Notably the branches of government are defined separately in the Constitution Act, 1867, supra
note I under the headings of "Executive Power," "Legislative Power" and "Judicature"-with certain
powers and limits applicable to each set out under these headings. These headings in the Australian
Constitution have given rise to a substantive doctrine of separation of powers: R v Kirby; Ex parte
Boilermakers'Society ofAustralia, [1956] HCA 10. For an analysis of the separation of powers and
delegated legislation in Australia see Appleby & Howe, supra note 139.
175. 2013 SCC 43.
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judiciary maintains the rule of law, by interpreting and applying these
laws through the independent and impartial adjudication of references
and disputes, and protects the fundamental liberties and freedoms
guaranteed under the Charter.' 6
The delegation of sweeping lawmaking powers by Parliament to the
executive does not respect the competency of the legislature in making
policy choices through its institutional processes, such as hearing witnesses
and detailed study by committee.
3. Judicial scrutiny of the vires of regulations
a. The current approach
Canadian courts recognize that "subordinate legislation must, in order
to be valid, come within the terms of the empowering statute."'177 This
form of judicial review involves a tripartite analysis: (i) interpreting the
scope of lawmaking authority delegated by the enabling legislation; (ii)
construing the meaning and purpose of the regulation at issue; and (iii)
assessing the vires of the delegated legislation, in other words, whether
the regulation falls within the scope of authority granted by its parent act.
The current approach to vires review is problematic as it does not provide
a sufficiently rigorous assessment of the scope of authority provided by the
enabling legislation and whether the regulation fits within this authority.
It also rewards the drafting of generic delegation provisions, which are
seen by courts as supplying broad lawmaking latitude to the executive that
minimizes the risk of regulations later being found to be legally invalid.
In the first and second parts of the analysis, courts consider the text,
context and purpose of the legislation to determine the available scope of
lawmaking authority and the meaning of the regulation.178 According to
the Supreme Court of British Columbia's leading judgment in Waddell v.
Governor in Council: 
179
In determining the scope of a power or discretion delegated by Parliament
it may be necessary to look beyond the literal terms of the particular
delegating provision of the enactment to ascertain limitations on that
power or discretion which must have been intended by Parliament.... In
determining whether impugned subordinate legislation has been enacted
in conformity with the terms of the parent statutory provision, it is
essential to ascertain the scope of the mandate conferred by Parliament,
176. Ibid at para 28.
177. Heppner vAlberta (Minister of Environment) (1977), 80 DLR (3d) 112 at 118, 4 Alta LR (2d)
139 [Heppner].
178. United Taxi Drivers'Fellowship of Southern Alberta v Calgary (City), 2004 SCC 19 at para 8.
179. (1983), 5 DLR (4th) 254, 49 BCLR 305 (BCSC) [Waddell].
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having regard to the purpose(s) or object(s) of the enactment as a whole.
The test of conformity with the Act is not satisfied merely by showing
that the delegate stayed within the literal (and often broad) terminology of
the enabling provision when making subordinate legislation. The power-
conferring language must be taken to be qualified by the overriding
requirement that the subordinate legislation accord with the purposes
and objects of the parent enactment read as a whole.80
Regulations are to be construed in light of their enabling legislation
"having regard to the language and purpose of the Act in general and
more particularly the language and purpose of the relevant enabling
provisions."'18 1 Courts tend to adopt a generous reading of the grant of
authority.182 There are numerous illustrations of courts taking an executive-
friendly approach to the interpretation of enabling legislation. For example,
in Waddell, the Supreme Court of British Columbia found the regulation
to be consistent with its parent act-which was construed so broadly that
it would have even allowed the executive to amend primary legislation.
183
In Attorney General of Canada v. Inuit Tapirisat,184 the Supreme Court of
Canada held that the wording of the delegation provision at issue provided
almost complete legislative discretion to the executive, subject only to
minimal jurisdictional limits.185
In the third part of the analysis, courts adopt a deferential approach in
working out whether the regulation fits within the scope of the authority
provided by the enabling legislation. This deference is aided by a strong
presumption of validity that regulations are "within the authority conferred
by the Act and [courts] will not declare it invalid unless there is clear
evidence to support such a finding."186 Courts will find an inconsistency with
the enabling legislation only when the regulation is seen as "irrelevant,"
"extraneous" or "completely unrelated" to the express terms of the statute
180. Ibid at paras 28-29. See also Katz Group Canada Inc v Ontario (Health and Long-Term Care),
2013 SCC 64 at para 26 [Katz]: "Both the challenged regulation and the enabling statute should be
interpreted using a 'broad and purposive approach ........
181. Sullivan, supra note 45 at 413 discussing Bristol-Myers Squibb Co v Canada (Attorney General),
2005 SCC 26.
182. See also David Williams, "Subordinate Legislation and Judicial Control" (1997) 8 Public L Rev
77 who refers to this approach as a benevolent interpretation.
183. Waddell, supra note 179 at paras 32, 36. Such a provision is referred to as a "Henry VIII clause,"
discussed earlier.
184. [1980] 2 SCR 735, 115 DLR (3d) 1 [Inuit Tapirisat cited to SCR].
185. Ibid at 756 (the case arose in relation to a claim for natural justice which was rejected).
186. Heppner, supra note 177 paras 30, 32 noting the presumption and that the burden of displacing it
rests with the plaintiff. See also 114957 Canada Ltee (Spraytech, Societe d'arrosage) v Hudson (Town),
2001 SCC 40. Keyes, supra note 46 at 544 notes that the review of a regulation for compatibility with
its enabling legislation is "tempered by presumptions of validity."
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or its purpose.187 For example, in Kubel v Alberta (Minister of Justice),188
the Alberta Court of Queen's Bench considered a statute authorizing the
provincial cabinet o define a "minor injury," which were subject to a cap
on non-pecuniary damages arising from automobile accidents. The Court
asked: "The term 'minor injury' signals that the Act intended to regulate
less serious injuries, but less serious than what?"18 9 While acknowledging
that some limits were imposed by the enabling legislation, the Court cited
with approval an academic summary of the case law that "subordinate
legislation enacted by a Cabinet will be found to be ultra vires on the
ground that it is inconsistent with the purposes of the enabling legislation
only in an egregious case.""19 It then upheld the cabinet's definition of
minor injuries as including certain physical disabilities and spinal
injuries.91 The Court was unwilling to engage in more than a cursory
probe of the regulation's vires, observing that in having formulated its
definition, the cabinet had struck a balance among competing interests:
"it is not the function of the courts to assess the merits of subordinate
legislation in a consideration of the vires of the that (sic) legislation."'192
And in the 2013 case of Katz Group Canada Inc v. Ontario (Health and
Long-Term Care),193 the Supreme Court of Canada upheld regulations that
were challenged as falling outside the purpose of their parent act. The
unanimous Court found that the regulations were valid even though they
were only indirectly connected with their enabling legislation.194 According
to the Supreme Court, the broad discretion provided by the legislature
meant that a wide range of means were available to the executive, and
whether the regulations at issue "ultimately prove to be successful or
represent sound economic policy is not the issue."195
187. Katz, supra note 180 at para 28 summarizing relevant case law.
188. 2005 ABQB 836 [Kubel].
189. Ibid at para 34.
190. Ibid citing DJM Brown & JM Evans, Judicial Review of Administrative Action in Canada
(Toronto: Canvasback Publishing, 1998) (loose-leaf) vol 3 at para 14:3352. It appears this language
comes from Justice Dickson in Thorne ' Hardware Ltd v The Queen, [1983] 1 SCR 106 at 111, 143
DLR (3d) 577.
191. Kubel, supra note 188 at paras 5-12, 34. Such injuries could not substantially and chronically
impair employment or daily living with no expectation of substantial improvement.
192. Ibid at para 32.
193. Katz, supra note 180.
194. Ibid at para 39.
195. Ibid. Recent case law reveals a divide among the Supreme Court on the proper analytical
framework to apply to questions of the validity of a regulation under its enabling legislation.
The first is the traditional vires approach, focused on jurisdiction and normally reviewed on a
correctness standard (although correctness standard's bark is worse than its bite in this context,
given the weaknesses of vires review as discussed). The second is a reasonableness review from the
administrative law jurisprudence. For a recent example see West Fraser Mills Ltd v British Columbia
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The deferential approach of the vires review of regulations can be
better understood against the backdrop of Canadian administrative law
more generally, in which courts have historically alternated between
interventionist and deferential approaches to decisions made by statutory
authorities. First, under the present judicial review framework, courts
impose a robust quality assurance review of all decisions by public
authorities that would implicate an individual's right, privilege or
interest. 196 In such cases, procedural fairness must be followed. Procedural
fairness may require the decision-maker to provide the individual with
advance notice of the decision to be made, disclosure of evidence, an
oral hearing, counsel, the opportunity to call evidence and cross-examine
witnesses, a timely process and written reasons for the decision.1" When
a tribunal is exercising what the court sees as legislative powers, however,
it is categorically exempt from the procedural fairness requirements on
the basis of an analogy to Parliament and its unencumbered lawmaking
process.198 Second, when it comes to the merits review of a decision
made by a public authority, courts impose a moderate "reasonableness"
analysis, which requires the outcome to be within a range of possible,
acceptable outcomes with respect to the law and the facts.199 Decisions
that are unreasonable, from the court's perspective, will be quashed as
unlawful on the ground that Parliament intends its delegates to make
reasonable decisions.2"' When it comes to the merits review of delegated
legislation, however, courts tip the scales of reasonableness to provide
maximum deference to the executive. For example, in the Supreme Court
of Canada's judgment in the 2012 case of Catalyst Paper Corp v. North
Cowichan (District),21 Chief Justice McLachlin observed that municipal
bylaws could be reviewed for vires to ensure that they come "within the
(Workers'Compensation Tribunal), 2018 SCC 22 [ West Fraser Mills], in which the majority adopted
a reasonableness review of a regulation while the dissenting judges in three separate opinions
would have reviewed the regulation under a correctness of vires approach The proposed reforms,
discussed below, would seek to strengthen the vires approach while integrating reasonableness and
proportionality review as additional steps in the vires analysis in certain circumstances.
196. For examples, see Cardinal v Director of Kent Institution, [1985] 2 SCR 643, 24 DLR (4th) 44
and Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 SCR 817, 174 DLR (4th)
193.
197. See Grant Huscroft, "From Natural Justice to Fairness: Thresholds, Content, and the Role of
Judicial Review" in Colleen M Flood & Lorne Sossin, eds, Administrative Law in Context, 2nd ed
(Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2012) 147.
198. HomexRealty v Wyoming, [1980] 2 SCR 1011, 116 DLR (3d) 1 and Inuit Tapirisat, supra note
184.
199. Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 [Dunsmuir].
200. Ibid.
201. 2012 SCC 2.
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legislative constraints."2"2 But when it came to the merits review of bylaws,
"reasonableness must be assessed in the context of the particular type of
decision making involved and all relevant factors."2" 3 Because a municipal
council typically enacts laws of general application that take into account
economic, social and political factors, Chief Justice McLachlin held that
bylaws would only be unreasonable in an exceptional case.2"4 While there
are compelling reasons to relax the merits review of decisions taken by
a democratic, representative and accountable body, the special treatment
of legislative functions in administrative law seems to have spilled over
into the vires analysis of regulations. When reviewing the exercise of
legislative functions in administrative law, the court adopts a deferential
posture, which appears to have also discouraged courts from imposing
stringent standards that would limit delegated legislation on the question
of vires.
b. Proposed reform
As guardians of the Constitution, the principle of legality and the rule of
law, judges patrol the boundaries of delegation to ensure that the use of
executive lawmaking power is constitutionally appropriate and otherwise
lawful.0 5 It is proposed that courts should adopt a stricter interpretation
of statutory provisions that delegate lawmaking power and strengthen the
rigour of the vires review of regulations to overcome the current weaknesses
that allow for the delegation of broad powers through generic words and
exceptionally wide latitude for the exercise of delegated power. The case
for reform is supported by the fact that delegation provisions are unique.
Delegation involves a transfer of constitutionally sanctioned lawmaking
power from one organ of the state to another. Lawmaking by the executive
is not what is expected or apparent from the constitutional framework and
it can be safely presumed that Parliament does not intend to casually lend
its lawmaking powers to others. To be legally effective, and overcome
this presumption, Parliament must make its intention to delegate clear.
Excessive delegation also erodes Parliament's constitutional role. Courts
should be much slower in accepting the delegation of sweeping powers to
the executive. The proposed reforms stand to better safeguard Parliament's
constitutional role as the principal architect of federal law and ensure that
it cannot pass along its powers through generic statutory language. There
202. Ibid at para 11. Although, as already discussed, the vires review of regulations is also deferential.
203. Ibid at para 18.
204. Ibid at para 20.
205. In Australia, Appleby & Howe argue that the court should "prod" Parliament along to properly
scrutinize delegated legislation: Appleby & Howe, supra note 139 at 10.
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are also other benefits to reform. A strict judicial approach to delegation
would have a knock-on effect of sharpening the legislative drafting of
delegation provisions. It would also allow for a more meaningful review
by the Clerk of the Privy Council who screens draft regulations and the
joint parliamentary committee that scrutinizes regulations, both of which
are discussed in more detail below. The reforms would also promote policy
coherence by requiring greater consistency between enabling legislation
and regulations. Finally, as there is already established precedent in
Canadian law that supports a stricter approach, the reforms are not as
radical as might first be imagined.2"6
It is proposed that courts should strengthen the vires doctrine in
relation to regulations and impose a more stringent review. First, given
that the main pressure point of the vires review is the scope of authority,
the scope should be limited by adopting a stricter interpretation of the
enabling legislation that can provide meaningful limits. The goal is to
craft a well-defined window that the regulation must fit within in order
to be confirmed as valid. Ambiguity or general language in the enabling
legislation should be narrowly construed. Second, all regulations should
be tested to ensure that they meet a minimum standard of rational
connection to the statutory purpose, and therefore fall within the expected
or ordinary use of the delegated power. This requirement should impose
a direct, immediate connection with the objects of the parent act.2"' Third,
courts should read into the enabling legislation a series of presumptions
that Parliament does not intend for the executive to: trespass unduly on
rights and freedoms including those at common law, statute and in the
Charter; enact regulations that operate retroactively; impose significant
fiscal obligations on the state or persons; impose significant penalties
on persons; or restrict the availability of judicial review.2"8 To the extent
these kinds of powers are delegated by Parliament to the executive, courts
should interpret them restrictively. Furthermore, given the potential for
abuse in such a case, the court should take the additional step of applying
a reasonableness review of regulations made under these powers to ensure
206. In Re Price Brothers and the Board of Commerce of Canada (1920), 60 SCR 265, 54 DLR 286.
Notably, this case has not been cited by a Canadian court since 1978.
207. Given the risk of the executive altering the policy scope endorsed by Parliament, courts should
more stringently review policies that may only be indirectly connected to the purpose of their enabling
legislation as was the case in Katz, supra note 180.
208. Adapted from the mandate of the Standing Joint Committee for the Scrutiny of Regulations:
Parliament of Canada, "Standing Joint Committee for the Scrutiny of Regulations: About" (3
December 2015), online: <parl.gc.ca/Committees/en!REGS/About> [perma.cc/7X8B-RZL7] at
Mandate ["Mandate"].
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that they can be justified.2"9 In the case where fundamental rights or
liberties are likely to be implicated by a regulation, the court should take
the further step of conducting a proportionality review to ensure that the
means chosen by the executive would only minimally impair the rights or
liberties.21 By incorporating reasonableness and proportionality as steps
in appropriate circumstances, the vires review would be considerably
strengthened.211 Fourth, the assessment of vires should be made more
rigorous by according less deference to the executive. Regulations and
executive action should not be so strongly presumed to be compatible with
the enabling legislation and a more common sense approach to testing
the compatibility of the regulation with the enabling legislation should be
carried out. The rationale of the current deferential approach is that it is not
the role of the court to review (and thus apparently question) policy choices
that are made by the executive. The Supreme Court has directed courts to
avoid 'judicializing the exercise of very broad executive power conferred
by Parliament."'212 While there are valid concerns about the proper role of
the court vis-ct-vis the executive and avoiding perceptions of the judicial
second-guessing of government policy, testing the vires of a regulation is an
important legal question that takes into account the statutory purpose and
the policy advanced by the regulation in order to test their compatibility.
This exercise is not equivalent to the judge independently imposing a
merits review of the executive: the judge reviews regulatory policy only
to ensure its consistency with the direction established by Parliament. To
maintain objectivity in the exercise, courts should expressly articulate the
goal of consistency with primary legislation as part of its duty to uphold
209. This reasonableness review is envisioned as a component of the broader vires review of a
regulation which would apply when the enabling legislation expressly ousts the ordinary interpretive
presumptions. The form of the reasonableness review should be similar to a standard reasonableness
review of administrative law: see, e.g., Dunsmuir, supra note 199. It would take into account the
reasons for the enactment of the regulation that may be included in the regulatory impact analysis
assessment published in the Canada Gazette during the consultative period or that can otherwise be
inferred by the court.
210. This proportionality analysis, as part of testing the vires of a regulation, draws from the Oakes
test to constitutional infringement: R v Oakes, [1986] 1 SCR 103, 26 DLR (4th) 200. If a specific
Charter infringement claim is made in relation to the validity a regulation, the ordinary section 1
analysis would also apply. For the Australian position see Edgar, supra note 139.
211. The proposed reform, by bringing reasonableness and proportionality review under a more
robust doctrine of vires, would offer greater consistency of approach-allowing the courts to move
past recent debates on the proper analytical framework to be applied: see West Fraser Mills and related
discussion, supra note 195.
212. CriminalLaw AmendmentAct, Reference, [1970] SCR 777 at 801, 10 DLR (3d) 669 per Laskin
J (in relation to the delegated power to bring legislation into force).
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the rule of law and the principle of legality-and ensuring that Parliament
plays its constitutional role as lawmaker in chief.213
It is important to note the constitutional implications of the proposed
reforms. The reforms seek to change the way in which courts interpret
legislation and test the vires of regulations, both of which are common law
doctrines. The impetus for the reform, however, is constitutional in the
sense that the reforms will better safeguard Parliament's constitutional role
and give effect to the principle of legality and the rule of law. Questions of
statutory interpretation and vires in relation to delegation and regulations,
while common law doctrines, operate against this constitutional backdrop.
It is not suggested that every question of interpretation or vires should
suddenly be transformed into a full-blown constitutional case: at a
minimum, what is constitutionally required is the availability of judicial
review to apply a meaningful assessment of the legal validity of a
regulation in light of its enabling legislation, one that takes the role of
Parliament as lawmaker in chief seriously. The reforms call upon courts
to further develop the common law in this area, and to use constitutional
controls only in limited circumstances to circumscribe the outer limits
of acceptable delegation practices as discussed below. Finally, it should
be noted that the reforms allow for Parliament to continue to delegate
important policy questions to the executive, but only where clear words
are used. In this way, Parliament will be required to put the public on
notice that it has delegated the power to make law on defined questions to
a body operating outside of Parliament, which will more effectively have
Parliament "confront what it is doing and accept the political cost."214
In exceptional cases, courts should impose constitutional controls to
limit the availability of delegation. As observed in the case law, delegation
should not be constitutionally permitted where its effect would be the
abdication and usurpation of Parliament by the executive. In addition,
when generic words are used in enabling legislation, which are incapable
of intelligent qualification by the text, context or purpose of the statute,
the court should hold the grant of authority invalid on the basis that it
is impermissibly vague, an established constitutional doctrine that is a
principle of fundamental justice and the rule of law:
213. Page, supra note 140 at 157 notes the question of vires involves "an interpretation of what
Parliament intended when it passed the parent legislation and thus scrutiny of legality can start to
appear to define policy" (emphasis added). The concern over the judicial scrutiny of policy may be
exaggerated as courts routinely consider policy and statutory objectives in interpreting and applying
legislation: see Katz, supra note 180 at paras 3-18 discussing the policy (and challenge) of keeping
prescription drug prices low. Courts also review the "reasonableness" of administrative action and test
legislation for compliance with Charter rights and freedoms.
214. Simms, supra note 36 at 131 per Lord Hoffmann.
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A vague provision does not provide an adequate basis for legal debate,
that is for reaching a conclusion as to its meaning by reasoned analysis
applying legal criteria. It does not sufficiently delineate any area of risk,
and thus can provide neither fair notice to the citizen nor a limitation of
enforcement discretion ... It offers no grasp to the judiciary. This is an
exacting standard, going beyond semantics.2"5
In applying the vagueness doctrine to delegation provisions, courts
must take into account the legitimate need to provide a certain measure
of discretion to the executive to make regulations that align with and
complement the enabling legislation in light of new circumstances. The
line to be drawn is not straightforward but can be gradually developed
through the jurisprudence. What is needed is an intelligible standard that
can be applied by the executive in making regulations and independent
courts in reviewing them. It is proposed that one way to draw the line
would be to impose a requirement of reasonable foreseeability, or in other
words, a minimum standard that permits a reader of the enabling legislation
to predict the scope of regulations that may be made thereunder. The scope
should be narrower than the general purposes of the legislation, with
some specificity for the kinds of regulations contemplated. In Germany,
for instance, the Constitutional Court requires that delegation provisions
allow a citizen "to predict how a delegated power will be exercised, and
to ascertain the interests and factors that must be taken into account by
the delegated law-maker."216 A similar standard in Canadian law would
prevent Parliament from using generic words that make it difficult for
courts to impose and patrol meaningful boundaries of delegated powers.
For example, section 27(1) of the Transportation ofDangerous Goods Act,
1992 begins by delegating lawmaking powers "generally for carrying out
the purposes and provisions of this Act," 217 This generic provision should
be seen as impermissibly vague on the basis that it does not allow the
reader to predict with any specificity the kinds of regulations that could be
made under it. By contrast, the provisions that follow in sections 27(1) and
27.1(1) of the Act would meet this hurdle. These provisions more clearly
direct and focus the regulation-making power and provide the reader
with a sense of what to expect. Section 27(1)(h) for instance delegates to
215. R v Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Society, [1992] 2 SCR 606 at 639, 93 DLR (4th) 36 per Justice
Gonthier for the Court. For an overview see Marc Ribeiro, Limiting Arbitrary Power: The Vagueness
Doctrine in Canadian Constitutional Law (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004).
216. Appleby & Howe, supra note 139 at 32. For a discussion of the non-delegation principle in the
United States see Cass R Sunstein, Designing Democracy: What Constitutions Do (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2003) cited in Appleby & Howe, supra note 139 at 28.
217. Supra note 4.
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the executive the power to make regulations "respecting circumstances
in which dangerous goods must not be imported, offered for transport,
handled or transported."'218
4. Parliamentary supervision of delegated lawmaking2. 9
a. The current approach
In 1972, Parliament established a mechanism to supervise executive
lawmaking when it repealed the Regulations Act and replaced it with the
Statutory Instruments Act 220 (SIA). The SIA provides a series of minimum
procedural requirements for the making of regulations. It also allows for
a parliamentary committee to scrutinize regulations and report its findings
to Parliament. The current approach to the parliamentary supervision of
delegated lawmaking is problematic as the committee's staff carries out
most of the work behind closed doors, with the committee reporting on only
a handful of regulations. In addition, the committee does not fully utilise
the powers it has as its disposal, namely to report and call witnesses, and to
recommend the revocation of problematic regulations. The inadequacies
of the Canadian approach become readily apparent by reviewing the
parliamentary scrutiny of regulations in the United Kingdom.
When moving the SIA for a second reading in the House of Commons
in 1971, Minister of Justice John Turner stated that its "dry title.. belies
what I believe to be the importance of this bill." 22 The Minister went on to
explain why the new legislation was so important:
218. Ibid. In addition to the vagueness doctrine, which should be seen to apply generally to all
Canadian legislation as part of the rule of law, when a regulation infringes a Charter right, it would
also need to be justified under section 1. Part of the section 1 analysis includes the consideration of
whether the limitation is "prescribed by law," which could similarly limit the exercise of executive
discretion in making delegated legislation. While the case law in this area is complex (and at times
contradictory), there is apparent support for a standard that would limit open-ended lawmaking
discretion. For secondary literature on point see Susan L Gratton, "Standing at the Divide: The
Relationship Between Administrative Law and the Charter Post-Multamn" (2008) 53:3 McGill LJ 477
and Robert Leckey, "Prescribed by Law/Une Regle de Droit" (2007) 45:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 571.
219. This Section incorporates and expands upon Lome Neudorf, "Rule by Regulation: Revitalizing
Parliament's Supervisory Role in the Making of Subordinate Legislation7' (2016) 39:1 Can
Parliamentary Rev 29.
220. RSC, 1985, c S-22 [Statutory Instruments Act].
221. "Bill C-182, Statutory Instruments Act," 2nd reading, House of Commons Debates, 28-3, vol 3
(25 January 1971) at 2734.
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As a direct result of the exercise of regulation-making powers... the
number of regulations that are being made has greatly increased and
the lives of all Canadians are now directly affected by regulations. It is
obvious and self-evident that the direct result of this increase of delegated
legislation has been a gradual erosion of the power of Parliament in its
role as guardian of the people of Canada.
In recent years concern has been expressed by members of the public as
well as by Members of Parliament relating to the increase of legislative
powers being given to the executive without any realistic form of
parliamentary control. I deeply share the concern of those individuals.
This legislation... is an attempt to restore a measure of parliamentary
control over the executive...
It is my hope that the members of the scrutiny committee will be able to
find the time to examine all regulations, but especially those that have
wide application to the public. In this way, members of the public will be
assured that Parliament is at least aware of those regulations which have
an impact on their daily lives.
222
The SIA applies to many forms of delegated legislation.223 It sets out
a limited process for the review, publication and scrutiny of regulations,
which may be supplemented by further requirements specified by the
enabling legislation. First, each draft regulation is sent to the Clerk of
the Privy Council for an initial review. 224 This review considers whether
the regulation is authorized by its enabling legislation, is an expected
or ordinary use of the authority, does not unduly trespass on rights and
freedoms and is in the proper form.225 Matters of concern may be drawn
to the attention of the regulation-making authority, although the Clerk
has no power to compel amendments or prevent a defective regulation
from being made.226 Second, when the regulation is made by the cabinet,
minister, or agency, it is again sent to the Clerk who then assigns it a
registration number.22' Third, the final regulation is published in Part II of
the Canada Gazette .228 In addition to the process under the SIA, a cabinet
directive requires the pre-publication of draft regulations in Part I of the
Canada Gazette, which allows for a period of public comment before the
regulation is made, although it is not clear to what extent the government
222. Ibid, at 2735-2736.
223. Statutory Instruments'Act, supra note 220, s 2(1) "regulation," "statutory instrument."
224. Ibid, s 3.
225. Ibid, s 3(2).
226. Ibid, s 3(3).
227. Ibid, ss 5-6.
228. Ibid, s 11.
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takes into account comments received in making the final regulation.2 29
Draft regulations are typically published with a regulatory impact statement
that explains their purpose. Once a regulation has been made and has the
force of law,230 it can be scrutinized by a special parliamentary committee.
Following the enactment of the SIA, Parliament established the
Standing Joint Committee for the Scrutiny of Regulations (SJCSR). As
a joint committee, the SJCSR includes members of both Houses. The
SIA provides that every statutory instrument made on or after January 1,
1972 is permanently referred to the SJCSR, which gives the committee
an exceptionally broad mandate to inquire into nearly all regulations.231
The SJCSR does not review the policies or merits of delegated legislation,
but instead conducts atechnical review on several grounds. For instance,
the committee may flag regulations that are not authorized by the
enabling legislation, are not Charter compliant or infringe other rights
and liberties, operate retroactively or impose liabilities without express
authority, exclude judicial review, infringe natural justice or the rule of
law, are defective in drafting, are procedurally irregular, or are otherwise
an unusual or unexpected use of the delegation power.232 Notably, the
committee also holds the power to review a regulation that "amounts to the
exercise of a substantive legislative power properly the subject of direct
parliamentary enactment,'233 although it is unclear whether this ground
has been invoked or what criteria would be used to answer this question.
The SJCSR reports to both Houses. It is empowered to bring forward a
resolution to revoke a regulation.234 In such a case, 30 days' notice must be
given to the regulation-making authority to provide it with an opportunity
to first remedy the problem.235 If the SJCSR remains unsatisfied and
resolves to revoke the regulation, the resolution is deemed adopted by the
Senate or Commons 15 sitting days later, unless a minister makes a motion
otherwise.236 The House of Commons has adopted standing orders that
elaborate the revocation procedure.237
229. Canada, Privy Council Office, Guide to Making Federal and Regulations, 2nd ed, Catalogue No
J2-8/2001E-IN (Ottawa: Department of Justice, 2001), online (pdf): <canada.ca/contentl/dam/pco-bcp/
documents/pdfs/fed-acts-eng.pdf> [perma.cc/Q9T2-LY7C], part 3.
230. See Statutory Instruments Act, supra note 220, s 9 for coming into force rules.
231. Ibid, s 19.
232. Mandate, supra note 208.
233. Ibid
234. Statutory Instruments Act, supra note 220, s 19.1.
235. Ibid, s 19.1(2).
236. Ibid, s 19.1(5).
237. House of Commons, "Delegated Legislation," Standing Orders, ch XIV (29 November 2018)
online (pdf): <ourcommons.ca/About/StandingOrders/SOPDF.pdf> [perma.cc/ZZR3-RECG].
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The SJCSR is well-resourced. It benefits from a number of support
staff, including clerks, assistants, analysts, research librarians, and the
resources of the Parliamentary Budget Officer.238 Despite these resources,
evidence of the scrutiny of regulations by parliamentarians on the
committee is disappointing. Between 2004 and 2015, the SJCSR issued
22 reports, two of which received responses from the government. Only
11 reports were made in relation to a specific regulation, with some reports
commenting on the same regulation.239 Instead of routinely reporting on
particular regulations, SJCSR reports often discuss broader, thematic
issues, such as questions relating to the interpretation of legislation. A
comprehensive screen for each regulation is instead performed behind the
scenes by SJCSR staff who draw problematic regulations to the attention
of committee members. When a problem is discovered, SJCSR staff or
members communicate directly with the regulation-making agency or
minister.24' The advantages of this informal approach include allowing the
government to save face and resolve the problem without political cost
and avoiding the committee having to put forward a formal revocation
resolution and risk its defeat (which could undermine the committee's
standing). However, there are also shortcomings. First, communication
between the committee and the government to resolve problems behind
closed doors is hard to reconcile with the principle of transparency. Second,
because communications are not published in the committee's reports,
there is a missed opportunity to draw attention to potential abuses of power
and important policy questions decided by regulations, which would better
hold the government to account. Third, there is little opportunity for those
outside the committee to identify systemic issues related to regulations
that could help generate ideas to strengthen the scrutiny process. Fourth,
there is a risk of the committee adopting an overly government-friendly
approach when it carries out its reviews in secret, particularly when the
committee is comprised ofa majority ofmembers from the governing party.
Fifth, there is little incentive for the government to take the committee
seriously if there is no real risk of public exposure, censure or revocation
of a regulation.
A comparison to the parliamentary scrutiny of regulations in the
United Kingdom reveals the inadequacy of the Canadian approach and
238. Parliament of Canada, "Standing Joint Committee for the Scrutiny of Regulations: 'About"'
<parl.gc.ca/Committees/en/REGS/About> [perma.cc/7X8B-RZL7] at Staff assigned to the Committee
['About'].
239. For example, report 2 in 2006, report 5 in 2007, and report 3 in 2009 were all made in relation to
the same broadcasting license fee regulation.
240. 'About,' supra note 238 at "Past Work."
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that much more can be done (although this system also has its limitations
-for example, its committees do not have the power of revocation).241
In 1946, the Westminster Parliament enacted the Statutory Instruments
Act 42 (SIA UK) to regulate the process of making delegated legislation.
Like the Canadian Act, the UK statute defines a statutory instrument
broadly.2 43 Unlike the Canadian Act, however, the UK statute provides for
the parliamentary scrutiny of regulations at the earlier lawmaking stage as
opposed to after the regulation has already been made. The possibility of
earlier intervention provides a better opportunity to influence the direction
of a regulation as it has not yet become law. There are two main methods
of control for regulations in the UK: negative and affirmative resolutions,
with the enabling legislation electing which procedure applies. The more
common of the two is negative resolution, which deems a regulation to
be approved unless there is an objection from either House. Pursuant
to sections 5 and 6 of the SIA UK, there are two sub-forms of negative
resolution procedures. The first requires a draft regulation to be laid before
Parliament for 40 days. The regulation cannot be made if it is rejected by
either House within that time. The second requires that when a regulation
is made, it must be laid before Parliament for 40 days during which time
either House may pass a motion to annul it. By contrast, the affirmative
procedure is more stringent as it requires the express approval from both
Houses. There are a variety of forms of the affirmative procedure seen in
different statutes, including approval requirements for draft regulations,
time limits in which approval must be given, and in some cases, approval
only from the Commons.
The UK Parliament has established a network of committees that
together offer a robust scrutiny of regulations. Three committees are tasked
with examining delegated legislation: the Joint Committee on Statutory
Instruments (JCSI),the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee (SLSC),
and Delegated Legislation Committees (DLCs). First, the JCSI examines
each regulation laid before Parliament to ensure that it complies with
technical rules and that it followed the proper process for coming into force.
It also reviews whether delegated powers are exercised in compliance with
the enabling legislation. As the JCSI is ajoint committee of the Lords and
241. For a four-country comparative study of parliamentary scrutiny of delegated legislation see John
E Kersell, Parliamentary Supervision ofDelegated Legislation: The United Kingdom, Australia, New
Zealand, and Canada (London: Stevens, 1960). Adam Tucker offers a critique of the UK scrutiny
committees: Tucker, supra note 2 at 363-70. See also Page, supra note 140 at 157-176 for a quantitative
analysis of scrutiny in the UK.
242. (1946), 9 & 10 Geo 6, c 36.
243. Ibid, s 1.
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Commons, it reports to both Houses. The JCSI may also conduct informal
scrutiny of draft regulations subject to affirmative resolution procedures
when requested by the regulation-making authority. In the rare case where a
statute does not require regulations to be laid before Parliament, the JCSI is
still empowered to examine regulations made under it.244 Second, the SLSC
is a committee of the House of Lords that reviews the policy implications
of regulations that are subject to the negative resolution procedure. Its
policy focus complements the JCSI's review of technical matters. There
are several grounds on which a regulation might be flagged by the SLSC,
including that the regulation is "politically or legally important," that is
may be "inappropriate" because of new circumstances since its enabling
legislation was made, that it "imperfectly achieves its policy objectives,"
that the government's material supporting the regulation is "insufficient,"
and that the consultation period was inadequate.245 Third, DLCs are ad hoc
Commons committees formed to discuss new regulations. In the 2015-
16 parliamentary session, there were 94 DLCs that considered specific
regulations or orders. DLCs provide a platform for discussing the merits of
delegated legislation. DLCs do not approve, reject, or amend regulations.
Instead, each DLC debates a motion that the "Committee has considered"
the instrument.246 Any regulation subject to an affirmative resolution is
referred automatically to a DLC, with the regulation later brought to the
floor of the Commons for a vote. Regulations or draft regulations subject
to a negative resolution procedure are considered by a DLC only if they
have been referred by the government.
In addition to these committees, the House of Lords has established a
Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee that reviews every
grant of authority made by each new bill to consider whether it "delegated
powers to an inappropriate degree of parliamentary scrutiny.1247 This
Committee safeguards the supervisory role of Parliament in relation
to regulations by ensuring that the usual scrutiny mechanisms are not
244. Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments, "Role," online: Parliament of the United Kingdom
<www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/J oint-select/statutory -instruments/role/>
[perma.cc/F3EG-CLKX]. Except for local regulations.
245. Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, "Terms of Reference," online: Parliament of the
United Kingdom <www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/lords-select/secondary-
legislation-scrutiny-committee/role/tofref> [perma.cc/WA4M-CKRN].
246. See, e.g., First Delegated Legislation Committee, "Draft Conduct of Employment Agencies
and Employment Businesses (Amendment) Regulations 2016," online (pdf): <www.publications.
parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmgeneml/delegl /160323 /160323sO 1.pdf> [perma.cc/4YF8-VP6Y] at 3.
247. Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, "Role of the Committee," online:
Parliament of the United Kingdom <www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/lords-
select/delegated-powers-and-regulatory-reform-committee/role/> [perma.cc/F62D-A6L7].
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circumvented by new legislation. Its proposed amendments to bills are
usually accepted by the government.24
The UK scrutiny committees are prodigious, and their many reports
are a treasure trove of information. It is clear from reading the reports
that the committees positively impact the quality of regulations made by
the executive. The JCSI made 25 reports in the 2015-16 parliamentary
session. In these reports, 86 problems were identified and reported to
Parliament. For each, the report summanizes correspondence between the
JCSI and the regulation-making authority. The reports indicate that a wide
range of problems were discovered including regulations that were ultra
vires, made an unexpected or unusual use of the delegated power, were
defective in drafting or required further information.249 Similarly, in the
2015-16 parliamentary session, the SLSC made 35 reports to the House
of Lords. These reports are of an exceptional quality, drawing attention
to problematic regulations from a policy perspective. Special attention
was drawn to 67 regulations while 104 other regulations were noted to
be of interest. Each report includes a plain-language overview of the
regulation and what it seeks to achieve and provides an insightful critical
perspective. In the 2015-16 parliamentary session, the SLSC drew special
attention to regulations that decided politically important issues or made
major policy changes that should be the subject of primary legislation,
did not benefit from a period of adequate consultation, were made on the
basis of insufficient or incorrect evidence, used means that were unlikely
to work in practice or achieve their objective, did not allow sufficient
time for implementation, were delayed in being laid before Parliament,
or were made even though the responsible individuals in the regulation-
making authority lacked a basic understanding of the issues.25 0 In addition
to reporting on flaws discovered in regulations, SLSC reports usefully
suggest questions that can be asked by members in the House. Finally,
for each DLC, a transcript of the debate is published by Hansard, which
may be used for reference by members when the regulation comes to the
floor of the Commons for a vote. In the 2015-16 parliamentary session,
248. UK, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, Strathclyde Review: Secondary legislation and the
primacy of the House of Commons by Lord Strathclyde (London: HM Stationery Office, 2015), online
(pdf): <gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment data/file/486790/53088 Cm 9177
Web Accessible.pdf> [perma.cc/8NQW-2PQ2] at 9.
249. Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments, "Publications," online: Parliament of the United
Kingdom <www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/j oint-select/statutory-
instruments/publications/> [perma.cc/ZBP2-AAAV].
250. Parliament of the United Kingdom, Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, "Publications"
<http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/lords-select/secondary-legislation-
scrutiny-committee/publications/> [perma.cc/KEW9-F27J].
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for example, the transcripts provide evidence of a focused debate on the
regulation, often with the minister responsible answering questions.1
b. Proposed reform
This reform seeks to strengthen the parliamentary scrutiny of regulations,
overcoming the limitations of the existing process by moving it closer to
that of the more robust United Kingdom system. UK scrutiny committees
report on individual regulations, publish summaries oftheir correspondence
with executive agencies, and explicitly consider the policy implications of
new regulations. Their rate of productivity greatly outpaces that of their
Canadian counterpart: each reporting UK committee generated more
reports in a single parliamentary year than the Canadian committee in a
decade. In addition, the UK benefits from a special committee to review
the grants of authority in each new bill, which brings expert review to each
delegation provision with the goal of safeguarding the lawmaking role of
Parliament by preventing new legislation from circumventing the scrutiny
processes. Canada should learn from and reform its mechanisms to match
the quality and rigour of the UK system, including establishing a review of
delegation provisions in new primary legislation, providing an opportunity
for the scrutiny committee to review regulations at the earlier lawmaking
stage, identifying flawed regulations in published committee reports and
summarizing correspondence with departments, and considering the
policy implications of regulations. The scrutiny committee should also
use its existing powers more routinely and effectively, especially those
of reporting, calling witnesses, and revocation, which will strengthen the
parliamentary oversight of executive lawmaking and ensure its work is
taken seriously.252
The justification for this reform is grounded in the constitutional
role allocated to Parliament, which is vested with exclusive legislative
authority in federal matters. Effective parliamentary scrutiny of executive
lawmaking is part of a constitutional obligation that flows from the
delegation of lawmaking power, otherwise vested in Parliament, to a body
operating outside Parliament that may not share Parliament's democratic,
representative or accountable qualities. As part of its constitutional
responsibility for lawmaking, Parliament must put in place appropriate
251. Parliament of the United Kingdom, Delegated Legislation Committee, "Debates" <http:/
www.parliament.uk/business/publications/hansard/commons/gc-debates/delegated-legislation-
committee/>.
252. A form of these proposals has beenbrought to the Canadian committee's attention: see Parliament
of Canada, Standing Joint Committee for the Scrutiny of Regulations, Minutes of Proceedings, Issue
No 28 (7 December 2017) (Lome Neudorf), online: <parl.ca/DocumentViewer/en/42-1/REGS/
meeting-29/evidence> [perma.cc/K5KA-PDPT].
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mechanisms, and use those mechanisms in fact, to supervise the exercise
of its powers by others.253 An analogy can be made to Parliament as a
fiduciary to Canadians because of its responsibility to act in the public
interest. 4 This relationship imparts a duty to supervise its delegates.
In the classic fiduciary relationship between a trustee and beneficiary,
the trustee is required to act personally in carrying out the trust. Where
delegation is permitted as an exception to the rule, for instance because of
an authorization in the trust instrument or a statute that permits delegation
in certain circumstances, the trustee must supervise the delegate and may
be liable to make good a loss suffered by the beneficiary that is caused
by inadequate supervision.5 By taking Parliament's role as lawmaker
in chief seriously through the establishment of a system for the effective
supervision of delegated legislation, Parliament will continue to play a
meaningful role in the lawmaking process. The risk of unaccountable
lawmaking power in the hands of the executive is too great: not only does
it erode Parliament's constitutional role, it can also lead to abuses of power
and defective laws. 6
The groundwork for this constitutional obligation has already been
carried out through the earlier cases that accept the validity of delegation
on the premise that Parliament can supervise and control its delegate
as necessary. Because the courts have already treated the possibility of
supervision as part of the delegation equation, it is one further step to
transform this expectation into a constitutional obligation-giving teeth to
what has already been expected of Parliament as a responsible practice for
more than a century. The question is what will be expected in terms of the
253. Tucker, supra note 2 at 361-363 in the context of the UK argues that constitutional principle
demands that aminimum standard of parliamentary scrutiny be applied that includes public justification
and vulnerability to defeat. Appleby & Howe, supra note 139 at 11 in the context of Australia argue
for greater scrutiny of delegated legislation on the basis that the High Court judgment in Williams
v Commonwealth (No 1), [2012] HCA 23 indicated a greater willingness for judges to enforce the
constitutional principle of responsible government.
254. For a scholarly discussion of this topic see, e.g., Evan Fox-Decent, Sovereignty Promise: The
State as Fiduciary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) and Lindsay Aagaard, "Fiduciary Duty
and Members of Parliament" (2008) 31:2 Can Parliamentary Rev 31. The Supreme Court of Canada
has recognized a fiduciary duty existing between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples: Guerin v The
Queen, [1984] 2 SCR 335, 13 DLR (4th) 321.
255. Gareth H Jones, "Delegation by Trustees: A Reappraisal" (1959) 22:4 Mod L Rev 381 at 383
noting case law on supervision For an example of a statutory supervisory duty see Trustee Act, RSBC
1996, c 464, s 15.5(3)(d).
256. For example, in 2017, the committee raised concerns about certain definitions used in firearms
regulations, particularly the vagueness of the terms that were used: Parliament of Canada, Standing
Joint Committee for the Scrutiny of Regulations, Proceedings-Evidence Issue 26 (23 November
2017) <parl.ca/DocumentViewer/en/42-1/REGS/meeting-27/evidence> [perma.cc/3E5L-R5QY]. The
issues identified with this regulation demonstrate the importance of scrutiny and why the committee
should be reformed to carry out a more robust scrutiny of regulations.
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standard of supervision and scrutiny to meet this obligation? Parliament
should establish and use a scrutiny mechanism that effectively maintains
a role for Parliament in the lawmaking process and holds the executive
to account in its use of lawmaking powers, ensuring that these are an
expected use of the powers from Parliament's perspective. While there
are practical limits of time and resources in reviewing the many thousands
of new regulations (one of the reasons driving delegation in the first
place), review by a committee or a series of committees is likely the best
use of limited resources as such bodies can carry out a detailed review
and report to Parliament. Moreover, technology may be able to play a
role in alleviating some of the time and resource pressure by flagging
questionable uses of delegated power.17 The constitutional obligation
is best addressed by Parliament itself taking responsibility for federal
lawmaking and strengthening its scrutiny mechanisms to make them more
effective. If needed, a court may issue a declaration of the constitutional
obligation as the impetus for Parliament to take the necessary action. In
an extreme case where the scrutiny system is totally ineffective, the court
may seek to enforce this constitutional obligation by holding inadequately
scrutinized regulations as legally ineffective. While such an outcome
would carry potentially serious legal consequences, a court in such a case
could suspend the declaration of invalidity to provide Parliament with the
opportunity to improve the scrutiny process.
25 8
5. A note on flexibility
While the delegation of lawmaking powers to the executive risks
undermining the constitutional role of Parliament as lawmaker in chief,
Parliament should retain the ability to delegate its lawmaking powers to
others where adequate safeguards are in place. The reality of lawmaking
in the 21st century is that the details of complex statutory schemes,
which often require the input of experts working in the field, cannot be
made by Parliament alone.25" Regulations are necessary, and desirable,
to complement primary legislation. Delegation provides the flexibility
needed to do the job of changing detailed rules quickly in response to
257. Significant advancements have been made in artificial intelligence to quickly analyze thousands
of pages of contracts, which may be adapted to regulations: see, e.g., Nicole Black, "Here's the
Lowdown on Contract Analytics Software" ABA Journal (23 March 2018), online: <abajournal.com!
news/article/heres the lowdown on contract analytics software> [perma.cc/DL9Q-LTND].
258. Reference Re Manitoba Language Rights, [1985] 1 SCR 712, 19 DLR (4th) 1 where the Supreme
Court created a new constitutional remedy of a suspended declaration of constitutional invalidity to
provide the government a period of time to fix constitutional defects before the provincial laws would
be declared unconstitutional in order to preserve legal order.
259. For an overview of Parliament's contemporary role, see Neudorf, supra note 7.
572 The Dalhousie Law Journal
new circumstances. But this flexibility does not authorize the executive
to overtake Parliament as the body that formulates answers to important
national questions. The proposed reforms will need to be flexibly applied
in appropriate circumstances. For example, the delegation of lawmaking
powers to a subordinate body that is itself democratic, representative and
accountable would reduce concern over the delegation of Parliament's
lawmaking authority. This flexibility should be applied to the three elected
legislatures of the Northwest Territories, Nunavut and the Yukon, each
of which is established by federal legislation that delegates lawmaking
powers.26 Territorial governments are also confined in their lawmaking
authority to a defined region, further diminishing concern about this form
of delegation undermining the role of Parliament as national lawmaker
in chief It may also be necessary in emergency situations to provide
additional flexibility to Parliament and the executive provided the
delegation is reasonable and proportionate to the circumstances.
261
Conclusion
It is time to reassess the constitutional foundation of delegated legislation
in Canada. Under the Canadian model of constitutional supremacy, we
must first look to the Constitution on the question of Parliament delegating
its lawmaking powers to others. The current approach, established a
century ago, accepts the sweeping delegation of Parliament's powers to
the executive. There are good reasons to reassess the constitutionality
of delegation and move past this precedent, which is problematic not
only because of its inconsistency with contemporary approaches to
constitutional interpretation but also its outcomes that have facilitated the
unchecked growth of unaccountable executive lawmaking power exercised
in secret at the direct cost of Parliament's role as lawmaker in chief. The
Constitution demands that courts and Parliament ake delegation seriously,
and better safeguard Parliament's lawmaking role. Under the living tree
purposive approach to constitutional interpretation, Parliament was
designed with democratic, representative and accountable qualities that
make it exclusively qualified to exercise federal lawmaking power. It is a
key part of the basic constitutional architecture. Delegation of sweeping
lawmaking powers to the executive poses a serious risk to Parliament's
role and threatens to undermine it completely in the context of a legislature
controlled by the executive, which can delegate any or all of Parliament's
lawmaking powers to itself The balance can be restored by strengthening
260. Northwest TerritoriesAct, SC 2014, c 2; NunavutAct, SC 1993, c 28; YukonAct, SC 2002, c 7.
261. However, it should be remembered that the role of the court in upholding the rule of law is often
most needed at a time of crisis.
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the judicial scrutiny of the vires of regulations and creating effective
parliamentary mechanisms to scrutinize and supervise the exercise of
delegated lawmaking powers. These reforms are practical and achievable,
and by adopting them, the courts and Parliament will give meaning to the
constitutional vision of Parliament and encourage Parliament to fulfil its
proper purpose. Nothing less than the vibrancy of Canadian democracy is
at stake.

